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  Abstract 
Motivated by extensive research suggesting that aspiration levels play a central role in the 
decision making of many individuals, we introduce  a target-based model of risky choice. A 
key aspect of the model is the decision maker's attitude towards risk: when prospects 
appear favorable relative to the target, the decision maker behaves in a risk averse way. In 
sufficiently dire circumstances, however, prospects may be in danger of failing to meet the 
target, and the decision maker can display “risk-seeking” behavior. By incorporating both 
targets and such a switch between risk attitudes, the approach can be viewed as a hybrid 
model, capturing in spirit the celebrated ideas of both satisficing  and prospect theory. The 
model is simple to motivate and applicable in settings where target attainment is of central 
concern to the decision maker. We show that such an approach is a natural dual to one 
based on risk measures. We establish structural properties, such as stochastic dominance, 
and show that the model has a general interpretation in terms of an index ranking prospects 
in the face of distributional ambiguity. Finally, though the model is simple and not designed 
with a specific intent to address any puzzles of decision theory, an interesting byproduct is 
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The notion of an aspiration level rests at the core of Simon's [37] concept of bounded rationality. A
central theme of this paradigm is that, due to limited cognitive resources and incomplete information,
real-world decision makers may plausibly follow heuristics in the face of risky choice: namely, satis¯cing
behavior, in which the decision maker accepts the ¯rst encountered alternative that meets a su±ciently
high aspiration level, may prevail.
It is not di±cult to imagine situations in which decision makers possess an aspiration level, or \tar-
get." For instance, the compensation of portfolio managers is closely linked to performance relative
to a benchmark. Individuals often choose to invest personal savings for the purpose of meeting costly,
downstream goals, such as retirement or their children's education. Consumers looking to make signi¯-
cant purchases or sales may have a reservation price in mind. In such situations, a target payo® or price
seems fairly natural, and it seems plausible that the realized performance relative to this target will
be a key standard by which the decision maker ultimately measures success. A number of descriptive
studies con¯rm this intuition and ¯nd, for real-world mangers, that aspiration levels are a key driver of
their decision-making (e.g., Lanzilloti [24], Mao [28], Payne et al. [31, 32]). More recently, Payne [30]
provides extensive experimental evidence that decision makers are highly sensitive to perturbations in
the probability of a loss or a gain. Diecidue and van de Ven [10] argue compellingly for the importance of
aspiration levels and develop a corresponding model that they show can be represented by discontinuous
utility functions.
At the same time, a cornerstone of most theories of risky choice is the idea of risk aversion. Whether
any deviations from risk aversion should unilaterally be deemed \irrational" is the subject of consider-
able dispute. This debate traces back at least to Friedman and Savage [16] and Markowitz [29], who
argue that it is not unreasonable at times for preferences to incorporate some degree of risk seeking be-
havior. There is also considerable descriptive evidence that real-world decision makers are risk seeking,
particularly for gambles involving losses (e.g., Fishburn and Kochenberger [13], Hershey and Schoe-
maker [20], Payne et al. [31], and many others). This idea has then been built into various models of
choice, most famously in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky [21].
The goal of this paper is to develop a model of choice with the notion of a target goal as its key
primitive. The model also allows for decision makers, in su±ciently dire circumstances, to exhibit risk
seeking tendencies, thereby capturing the central theme of prospect theory. Because of the link to these
two, core ideas, we call the resulting model of choice prospective satis¯cing preferences (PSP).
Our framework is based on properties that we feel are relatively simple and straightforward to
motivate in settings where a target goal is the key focus of the decision maker. The basic properties of
our PSP choice model can be succinctly described as follows:
(a) Satis¯cing: a position that can surely beat the target will be maximally preferred; conversely, a
position that de¯nitely cannot attain the target will be least preferred.
(b) Monotonicity: if one position always outperforms another (in any state), then the outperforming
position is always preferred among the two.
1(c) Diversi¯cation behavior: diversi¯cation is preferred among positions that are somehow \secure"
relative to attaining the target; concentration is preferred among positions that are somehow
\vulnerable" relative to attaining the target.
(a) captures the spirit of satis¯cing: decision makers following this model have a target goal in mind
and are fully content to select a position that guarantees that they will attain this target. (b) simply
means such decision makers do not prefer less to more. Finally, (c) suggests that such a decision maker
will prefer to mix among positions to make the net stake more secured in terms of target attainment,
but only when such positions are already relatively safe bets; if the available positions are in danger of
missing the target, rather than mixing between these unfavorable prospects, the decision maker prefers
to \roll the dice" and select a single position that will provide the best hopes of attaining the target.
Risk seeking behavior of this °avor does not seem outrageous when achieving a target is the decision
maker's focal point. This is, of course, a rough description of the model, and we will motivate and
discuss it in more detail later.
The PSP model has ties to the approach of satis¯cing measures recently proposed by Brown and
Sim [5]; speci¯cally, the model of choice induced by (a) and (b) above can be shown to be equivalent to
choice with a satis¯cing measure in [5]. Related performance measures have also been developed. Cherny
and Madan [6] develop what they call an \acceptability index" (geared towards absolute performance
measurement, i.e., a target of zero) that fall into the class of coherent satis¯cing measures of [5]. Aumann
and Serrano [3] have axiomatized an \index of riskiness" that is the reciprocal of the entropic satis¯cing
measure of [5]. Recently, Drapeau and Kupper [11] axiomatized risk preferences that satisfy (b) and
quasi-concavity, which results in a model that includes the quasi-concave satis¯cing measures of [5].
Property (c), however, results in a model distinct from those above, which are models that favor
diversi¯cation. The allowance of some amount of risk seeking behavior in the PSP model here is a
nontrivial deviation that results in a signi¯cantly di®erent representation. Moreover, this di®erence has
important implications from a choice perspective. For instance, under fairly mild assumptions, using a
satis¯cing measure from [5], a decision maker would be unable to distinguish among a set of prospects
that all have negative expected values (with respect to the target). Such a model is therefore not well-
suited to handle choice problems that involve a selection among unfavorable positions. By contrast, in
the PSP model, one can distinguish among such positions.
A further di®erence from [5] is that we explore some of the descriptive relevance of PSPs. In
particular, we ¯nd that the model can resolve the paradoxes of Allais [1] over a fairly wide range of
targets. In addition, because PSPs do not require a particular probability measure on the outcome
space, they can therefore naturally incorporate ambiguity, thereby addressing the criticism of Ellsberg
[12]. We also ¯nd that this model can accommodate some more recent, \neoclassical" puzzles of decision
theory. We would like to state upfront that we do not motivate the model with a particular descriptive
intent in mind; our goal is simply to provide a target-based model of choice that is relatively easy to
describe and justify. The descriptive relevance of the model is purely a byproduct and is, as we see it,
somewhat surprising as a result.
At the outset, we mention that this model is simply a proposal for risky choice that we feel is
reasonably well-motivated in settings where a target goal is the primary focus of the decision maker.
Like any model of choice one can surely construct example sets of risky prospects for which rigidly
2adhering to PSP can lead to choice behavior that may seem puzzling. Expected utility theory is of
course no exception here, as many have called into question the independence axiom or the inability
of EUT to handle ambiguity in subjective probabilities (see, e.g, Machina [26], Quiggin [33] and Yaari
[41], and Gilboa and Schmeidler [18], among numerous other modi¯cations of expected utility theory).
Nonetheless, we feel that the model possesses a number of features that are practically useful and
theoretically desirable. First, the key parameter for practical use of the model is the target goal. This
is in contrast to a model of choice, like one based on expected utility values or risk measures, that
requires speci¯cation of some sort of tolerance parameter. While it is true that one can attempt to elicit
utility functions or their parameters (see, e.g., Wakker and Dene®e [39] for a discussion of this process
in the face of ambiguity), it seems hard to argue that such elicitation is more natural than specifying
targets. For instance, it is easy to imagine that many practicing managers may have a fairly good idea
of reasonable target performance they would like to attain. On the other hand, it is more di±cult to
envision such a manager ¯rmly believing that they should weigh monetary outcomes according to, say,
a power function, then performing reference gamble experiments to determine an appropriate coe±cient
of relative risk aversion. In fact, it seems likely that many individuals may not even be able to assign a
real meaning to such a coe±cient; on the other hand, a target goal is a concrete entity that anyone can
understand.
The PSP model, in contrast to many choice models, does not attempt to directly assign a value to
each possible monetary outcome, and we caution the reader upfront to take great care in making direct
comparisons to such models. We will prove a general representation result that states that choice under
PSP is, in fact, equivalent to ranking prospects according to an index level. This index level is the
maximum level at which a corresponding risk measure is \acceptable." Over positions that are \secure"
relative to the target and for which diversi¯cation is preferred, the risk measures in the representation
are shown to be convex risk measures, developed by FÄ ollmer and Schied [14] as a generalization of the
coherent risk measures introduced by Artzner et al. [2]. Over positions that are \vulnerable" relative
to the target, on the other hand, the representing risk measures will be concave.
This representation result shows that choice under PSP is dual to choice under risk measures. An
important consequence of such a representation is that it allows us not only to describe and implement
PSP choice in terms of already understood objects (for example, the choice function can be induced by
conditional value-at-risk or CARA utility; as another example, under some assumptions on the space of
random variables, Sharpe ratio is a special case of our model), but it also allows us to leverage known
properties of such risk measures. For instance, under mild assumptions we can show that the PSP
model obeys ¯rst-order stochastic dominance everywhere and second-order stochastic dominance over
secured positions. We note that this would not be true if one were to simply rank positions according
to their probability of hitting the target.
Finally, an appealing feature of the PSP model is that it does not require speci¯cation of a probability
distribution. If one has probabilities, they can of course be used, but such a description is not necessary
for the model. In fact, we will provide a generic interpretation of the model in terms of a risky position's
expected payo® in the face of distributional ambiguity. This ambiguity interpretation is a consequence
of the dual representation and is not obvious from the PSP properties themselves; this brings us,
interestingly enough, full-circle back to Simon's [37] notion of bounded rationality, which posits that
3probabilities are typically not fully precise quantities.
Before moving forward, we would like to state that the terms \satis¯cing" and \prospective" here
should not be taken fully literally, but are instead capturing these ideas in spirit. Simon [37] certainly
had a very speci¯c de¯nition of satis¯cing; our model does not state that decision makers should satis¯ce
in the strictest sense of the word, as in waiting for the ¯rst opportunity that exceeds the target. In fact,
in the context of risky choice, this is not even a meaningful mode of behavior, as payo®s are uncertain.
Moreover, we can talk about optimizing a satis¯cing measure, a phrase that may seem like an oxymoron
to purists. The idea is mainly that we are capturing some of the essence of the satis¯cing idea via target
goals as the centerpiece of the model. A similar story holds with prospect theory; the PSP model is quite
di®erent than the one developed by Kahneman and Tversky [21] and one cannot directly map between
the two. Nonetheless, our model utilizes a key component of their theory: namely, risk attitudes that
somehow vary according to performance relative to a target.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we ¯rst introduce the model and then give
the main theoretical result of the paper, which is the representation theorem in terms of risk measure
families. We then present some examples of PSPs and provide mild conditions under which stochastic
dominance orders hold. In Section 3, we show how the model can resolve some of the inconsistencies
of expected utility theory stemming from observed violations of the independence axiom. Section 4
discusses how to use PSPs in settings of ambiguity, e.g., situations where the Ellsberg paradox emerges.
Section 5 discusses optimization with our model and provides an example application to portfolio choice.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Prospective satis¯cing and its representation
In this section, we introduce the model and show its representation in terms of a classical notion of
\risk measures."
Uncertainty is given by a state-space ­ and a set (sigma-algebra) F of events A µ ­. We denote
by V the set of feasible prospects V : ­ ! R; V 2 V can be viewed as the random payo® tomorrow of
a particular alternative chosen today. Note that we do not assume a speci¯c probability measure on ­.
We consider the situation of a decision maker who wants to choose a prospect from V. The decision
maker has an aspiration level ¿, which is another prospect on ­, not necessarily in V. If ¿ is constant,
it can simply be thought of as a ¯xed target payo®; otherwise, it can be viewed as a reference prospect
or benchmark, also random, that the decision maker wishes to outperform.
We assume that the target is speci¯ed exogenously (i.e., it is an input from the decision maker). We
thus consider only payo®s relative to this target; in particular, we de¯ne the set of target premia to be
X = fV ¡ ¿ : V 2 Vg; (1)
and we will henceforth suppress the notation of the target. X(!) ¸ 0 means the target has been
achieved (or exceeded) in state !; X(!) < 0 means the target has not been attained in state !. The
notation X ¸ Y denotes state-wise dominance, i.e., X(!) ¸ Y (!) for all ! 2 ­.
It is worth emphasizing that the space of target premia is a set of random variables, not a set
of lotteries. For the latter, the payo®s in a given state would typically be ¯xed across the set, and
4one would look at varying the probability distribution. With a set of random variables, however, this
restriction need not be imposed. This seems more natural in many settings; for instance, in a portfolio
choice context, the states may correspond to di®erent return outcomes, and the set of random variables
may correspond to di®erent allocation choices. In this setting, di®erent positions would pay di®erently
in the same state, and therefore describing this as a set of lotteries seems rather unnatural.
We model decision maker's preferences using a preference relation º on X. For target premia
X;Y 2 X, the decision maker prefers X to Y if and only if X º Y . As usual, Â and » are de¯ned by
[X Â Y , (X º Y )and:(Y º X)] and [X » Y , (X º Y )and(Y º X)].
We begin with the standard assumption that the preference order is complete, re°exive, and tran-
sitive, in addition to some technical conditions.
Property 1 (Weak order and upper semi-continuity). Let º be a weak order on X that satis¯es:
(i) For all X 2 X, the set fY 2 X : Y º Xg is closed in X (upper semi-continuity).
(ii) There exists Z ½ X that is order-embeddable1 into [0;1] such that for all X;Y 2 X with X Â Y ,
there exists Z 2 Z such that X º Z º Y .
The assumption of a weak order is standard. Properties (i) and (ii) are technical conditions needed
to obtain a functional representation of º, which we will do in Subsection 2.1. For the purpose of this
paper, the classical continuity assumption as de¯ned by Debreu [8] is too restrictive, since it excludes
preference relations in the spirit of Simon [37] (e.g., X º Y if and only if ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ), where ½ : X ! R
satis¯es ½(X) > 0 on fX ¸ 0g (satisfactory payo®s) and ½(X) < 0 on fX < 0g (unsatisfactory payo®s)).
Following a generalization of Rader [34] we thus impose upper semi-continuity (Property (i)). This is
obviously weaker than continuity and allows preference relations that will have a satis¯cing °avor.2
We then require the following.
Property 2 (Monotonicity). For all X;Y 2 X, if X ¸ Y then X º Y .
Monotonicity says that a premium that dominates another premium state-wise is preferred among
the two. This is a classical assumption on preferences, and it says that decision makers do not prefer
less to more.
In the spirit of Simon [37], we next have the following.
Property 3 (Satis¯cing behavior).
(i) Attainment content: If X ¸ 0, then X º Y for all Y 2 X.
1Z is order-embeddable into [0;1] when there exists a order-preserving function f : (Z;º) ! [0;1].
2Upper semi-continuity is not enough for a functional representation of º. As in the classical result of Debreu [8], we
need to impose some countability conditions on the topological space. Rader [34] assumes that the topological space is
second countable. This, in addition to upper semi-continuity, is su±cient to derive a functional representation of º, but
it is not necessary: it can be weakened to hold on any topological space if an additional condition holds. Namely, º must
possess a functional representation on a subset Z of X and for any jump (X;Y ) in X there must be an element Z 2 Z
with X º Z º Y (a jump in X is a pair of elements (X;Y ) 2 X £ X, X Â Y , such that fZ 2 X : X Â Z;Z Â Y g = ;).
This is Property (ii). Note that since Z can be assumed to be countable (see Bosi and Mehta [4]), Property (ii) implies
that X only contains countable many jumps.
5(ii) Non-attainment apathy: If X < 0, then Y º X for all Y 2 X.
Satis¯cing behavior relates to the properties of the satis¯cing measures of Brown and Sim [5].
Satis¯cing measures are functions ½ : X ! [0;1] that will lead to choosing a position X over Y if and
only if ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ). The key properties of satis¯cing measures are as follows. First, monotonicity: if
X ¸ Y , then ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ). Next, attainment content: namely, if a position always beats the target,
(i.e., X ¸ 0), then we are fully satis¯ed with it (i.e., ½(X) = 1). Conversely, non-attainment apathy: if
a position never beats the target (i.e., X < 0), then we are fully unsatis¯ed with it (i.e., ½(X) = 0).
Property 3 is the analog for preference relations of these two latter properties of satis¯cing measures.
This property captures the essence of a target-driven decision maker: namely, achieving this aspiration
level is paramount, and prospects that always (never) do so should be most (least) highly valued.
This squares with a wide body of empirical evidence of how real-world managers operate; Mao [28],
for instance, concludes after interviewing many executives that \risk is primarily considered to be the
prospect of not meeting some target rate of return." Diecidue and van de Ven [10] make a convincing case
on this point and provide many more references based on corroborating empirical evidence. Managers
are certainly not alone in this behavior: Payne [30] recently showed that many decision makers would
be willing to accept a decrease in a gamble's expected value in order to reduce just the probability of a
loss.
One may observe that if every position in X is always above (or always below) the target in every
state, then such preferences will be indi®erent to every choice in X, and one may question the usefulness
of the model in such situations. We see two, primary counterarguments to this critique. First, if a
decision maker truly does possess a target that is so low that every available position beats it in every
state of the world, then such an unambitious decision maker may very well be willing to simply accept
any of them.
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, it may often be the case that targets are tied to the
available opportunity set: the decision maker would be unlikely choose an extreme target that is overly
conservative (or unreasonably ambitious). In a portfolio choice context, for instance, it seems somewhat
implausible for the investor to choose a target that is so high that there is no state in which it can ever
be attained for any possible investment choice. On the °ip side, if the target is so low that every possible
position always beats it in every state, then one may reasonably believe such an unmotivated investor is
perfectly happy with a simple, risk-free investment. So, while it is true that the above preferences cannot
distinguish across positions in these cases, such circumstances demand seemingly extreme targets, and,
in these situations, the choice problem itself seems rather uninteresting in the ¯rst place. Of course,
the issue of how individuals form targets is an interesting one; again, here we are taking the target to
be exogenously speci¯ed by the decision maker.3
On a related note, we concede that Property 3 makes our model ill-suited to distinguish among a
set of purely deterministic gambles. By monotonicity and Property 3, decision makers would indeed be
indi®erent to all sure bets above (or below) the target. We would argue, however, that such decision
settings are rare in the real world and not of much interest. Uncertainty plays a key role in real-world
3Gilboa and Schmeidler [19] provide a model of aspiration level adjustment over time and argue that a \realistic" model
of such adjustments should relate aspiration levels to past performance in similar situations. Though the overall model is
very di®erent from ours, their perspective seems to align well with our above appeal to \reasonable" target levels.
6decisions, and where our model has the most discriminatory power are in challenging situations when
the relevant prospects have some chances of falling above and below the target.
A simple example of a ranking function that would satisfy the above preferences is ½(X) = PfX ¸ 0g.
The di±culty with using probability of beating the target as a basis for choice is that in general it will
not favor diversi¯cation, and at least some degree of diversi¯cation-favoring or \risk aversion" behavior
is generally considered to be a desirable feature of most models of risky choice. Using the probability of
beating the target as a guide for portfolio choices, for example, optimal allocations may often be those
that are highly invested in a small number of assets if not a single asset. Furthermore, the probability
of beating a target is a very crude tool for decision-making: it is easy to construct examples of two
target premia with one ¯rst-order stochastically dominating the other but for which both have the
same probability of beating the target. A related downside is that, computationally, maximizing the
probability of beating the target is, in general, a very di±cult optimization problem.
Brown and Sim [5] show how to induce a desire for diversi¯ed positions in the satis¯cing measure by
imposing that ½ be a quasi-concave function (i.e., ½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¸ minf½(X);½(Y )g). This seems
desirable for positions for which we are relatively con¯dent that the target will be attained; on the other
hand, it seems implausible that investors would always want to diversify among positions that are in
danger of not attaining the target.
As a simple illustration of this, consider a case with j­j = 2, and consider the two positions X =
f0;¡1g, Y = f¡1;0g. Both of these positions may attain the target, but notice that any convex
combination ¸X +(1¡¸)Y results in the position Z = f¡(1¡¸);¡¸g, which never attains the target.
If attaining the target is truly the investor's goal, then ranking every such Z as not worse than both
X and Y , as a quasi-concave satis¯cing measure would, seems problematic. Of course, if the positions
are reversed in sign, then it certainly does seem to make sense to value diversi¯cation; the position Z
now is f1 ¡ ¸;¸g and always attains the target, so it should not be worse than both X = f0;1g and
Y = f1;0g.
Another example, which relates to the modern portfolio theory of Markowitz [29], is the following.
Consider an investor who wishes to maximize the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio relative to a target rate of
return ¿ (this is a classical approach in portfolio theory and if returns are normally distributed, this is
equivalent to the problem of maximizing the probability of beating the target). Denote the mean and






: w 2 W
¾
;
where W is a feasible set of portfolio choices. The properties of the objective function depend on the
size of ¿: it is a quasi-concave function over the set of w 2 W with mean return no smaller than ¿
(and hence diversi¯cation will be favored here). On the other hand, if there are no such w 2 W, then
the objective is actually quasi-convex and concentration is preferred. Thus, we ¯nd even fairly classical
settings in which diversi¯cation is not always desirable.
These examples suggest that a target-oriented model of choice may need to be more discriminating
in whether it values diversi¯cation or not. This is somehow intuitive: if circumstances are ominous and
attaining a target is of high priority, a decision maker may not want to rest on their laurels and take very
conservative positions. Moreover, there is a rather large body of empirical evidence that suggests that
7real-world decision makers are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses; therefore, incorporating
some risk seeking behavior potentially enhances the descriptive relevance of the model.
This motivates the following:
Property 4 (Prospective behavior). There exists a partition of X into three disjoint subsets X++, X¡¡
and X0, termed the secured, vulnerable and neutral sets of target premia, respectively, such that for all
X¡ 2 X¡¡; X1; X2 2 X0; X+ 2 X++, we have
X+ Â X1 » X2 Â X¡;
and the following conditions hold:
(i) Diversifying (convex preferences) over secured target premia: For all X;Y 2 X++, if X º Z,
Y º Z then
¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y º Z 8¸ 2 [0;1]:
(ii) Concentration over vulnerable target premia: For all X;Y 2 X¡¡, if Z º X, Z º Y then
Z º ¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y 8¸ 2 [0;1]:
This property states that decision makers can categorize target premia in X into three sets depending
on their abilities to achieve the target: among these three, secured target premia in X++ are most
desirable, vulnerable target premia in X¡¡ are least desirable, and the target premia in the neutral set
X0 are in between and are not ranked (decision makers do not display a strict preference among any of
them). The sets X++ and X¡¡ can, loosely speaking, be interpreted as sets of prospects for which there
are relatively good and relatively poor chances, respectively, of attaining the target. Properties (i) and
(ii) above capture the notion of when decision makers should and should not gain from diversi¯cation,
i.e., when convex preferences should be imposed. Property (i) states that diversi¯cation is bene¯cial
on the set of secured target premia, while (ii) says that concentration should be preferred on the set of
vulnerable target premia.
Note that we have placed no particular restrictions on the set of secured or vulnerable premia. All
that we are imposing is that there exists such a partition and that diversi¯cation (concentration) is
desirable for positions that are preferred (not preferred) over this partition. We will later show that
when we have a probability distribution describing the world, under mild conditions, the set of secured
(vulnerable) premia will essentially be those with positive (negative) expected values. When we do not
assume the existence of a particular distribution but instead have a set of possible distributions, this
interpretation will also extend in a natural way to the worst-case or best-case expected value over the
set of distributions. This structure for the secured and vulnerable sets is purely a consequence of the
full preference relation, however, and it is not assumed in Property 4 above.
De¯nition 1. A preference relation º that satis¯es Properties 1-4 is called a prospective satis¯cing
preference relation (PSP).
82.1 Representation of PSPs
The ¯rst result that we report is that prospective satis¯cing preference relations possess a functional
representation. This functional representation is a fairly transparent analog of the preference de¯ni-
tion; we present it mainly because it is sometimes convenient (particularly in the proof of our main
representation theorem to follow) to work with a choice functional rather than a preference relation.
Proposition 1. A preference relation º is a prospective satis¯cing preference relation if and only if
there exists an upper semi-continuous function ½ : X ! R [ f¡1;1g such that
X º Y , ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ):
Moreover, ½ satis¯es the following for all X; Y 2 X:
(i) Monotonicity: If X ¸ Y , then ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ).
(ii) Satis¯cing behavior:
(a) Attainment content: If X ¸ 0, then ½(X) = 1.
(b) Non-attainment apathy: If X < 0, then ½(X) = ¡1.
(iii) Prospective behavior:
(a) Superiority of secured premia and inferiority of vulnerable premia:
½(X)
8
> > > <
> > > :
> 0 if X 2 X++;
= 0 if X 2 X0;
< 0 if X 2 X¡¡:
(b) Quasi-concavity (diversifying) over secured target premia: For all X;Y 2 X++;¸ 2 [0;1]:
½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¸ minf½(X);½(Y )g:
(c) Quasi-convexity (concentrating) over vulnerable target premia: For all X;Y 2 X¡¡;¸ 2
[0;1]:
½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · maxf½(X);½(Y )g:
De¯nition 2. An upper semi-continuous function ½ : X ! R [ f¡1;1g that satis¯es properties
(i)-(iii) in Proposition 1 is called a prospective satis¯cing measure (PSM).
A few words about units are in order. First, the fact that we take ½ to map to R [ f¡1;1g is
primarily for convenience (any other continuous interval, such as [0;1], would work). We will show
shortly that PSMs are essentially ranking indices; thus, one should resist the temptation to interpret
½(X) as a value representing some kind of subjective worth of the prospect X. A PSM value is a
quantity used to make relative comparisons and therefore the \units" of a PSM are of little importance.
As such, one must also be careful in making \strength of preference" interpretations with a PSM.
9Inspection of Proposition 1 shows that given a PSM ½ we can characterize the sets of neutral, secured
and vulnerable sets as follows:
X0 = fX 2 X : ½(X) = 0g
X++ = fX 2 X : ½(X) > 0g
X¡¡ = fX 2 X : ½(X) < 0g:
(2)
Though we have shown existence of a functional representation for PSPs, the properties of a PSM
are fairly straightforward analogs of the properties for a PSP. Moreover, the properties for prospective
satis¯cing measures do not provide a complete description of what a PSM may look like. More generally,
it is interesting to connect the PSP model to other choice models. We now show how one can represent all
PSMs in terms of a more classical de¯nition of a \risk measure." Risk measures are distinct mathematical
entities from PSMs and are motivated and de¯ned in a very di®erent way. Therefore, it seems quite
intriguing that they are so closely connected to PSMs.
Following FÄ ollmer and Schied [14], we ¯rst formally de¯ne the concept of a risk measure.
De¯nition 3. A function ¹ : X ! R is a risk measure over X if it satis¯es the following for all
X; Y 2 X:
1. Monotonicity: If X ¸ Y , then ¹(X) · ¹(Y ).
2. Translation invariance: If c 2 R, then ¹(X + c) = ¹(X) ¡ c.
A risk measure ¹ may be interpreted as the amount of money (\capital") needed to make a position
acceptable by some standard. Namely, ¹(X + ¹(X)) = ¹(X) ¡ ¹(X) = 0, i.e., adding the capital ¹(X)
to the risky position X, one obtains a new position with \zero risk," and positions with non-positive
risk can be considered as acceptable. In other words, acceptable positions do not require additional,
guaranteed capital. We now formalize the concept of acceptable positions.
De¯nition 4. Let ¹ : X ! R be a risk measure. The subset A¹ of X de¯ned by
A¹ = fX 2 X : ¹(X) · 0g
is called the acceptance set associated to the risk measure ¹ and X 2 A¹ is an acceptable position.
The two properties of risk measures have clear implications for the acceptance set: if one position
always pays as much as an acceptable position, then it must be acceptable as well. In addition, if we add
a constant payo® to a risky position, then the amount of capital required to make the position acceptable
is reduced accordingly. We refer the reader to FÄ ollmer and Schied [15] and the many references therein
for more on risk measures and the properties of the corresponding acceptance sets.
Though it is not necessary for the main results, we will assume throughout that the risk measure is
normalized; in other words, ¹(0) = 0. This is without loss of generality due to translation invariance.
The class of convex risk measures has garnered much attention. Formally, we say a risk measure is
convex if, for any X; Y 2 X, ¸ 2 [0;1],
¹(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · maxf¹(X);¹(Y )g (3)
10and concave if
¹(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¸ minf¹(X);¹(Y )g: (4)
Notice that the preference relation º¹ induced by a risk measure ¹ will follow X º¹ Y if and only if
¹(X) · ¹(Y ). It is not hard to see that (3) is equivalent to the preference relation º¹ being diversi¯ca-
tion favoring (i.e., convex preferences), and (4) is equivalent to º¹ being concentration favoring. Convex
risk measures are usually de¯ned (e.g., FÄ ollmer and Schied [14]) via ¹ satisfying convexity directly, not
quasi-convexity as in (3); we now show that this is in fact equivalent.
Proposition 2. A risk measure ¹ that is diversi¯cation favoring is equivalent to the function ¹ being
convex, i.e., for all X; Y 2 X, ¸ 2 [0;1], ¹(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · ¸¹(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹(Y ). Likewise,
concentration favoring is equivalent to the function ¹ being concave.
Typically, convex risk measures are described with convexity (as opposed to quasi-convexity, which,
via Proposition 2, implies convexity when the function is translation invariant) directly. We use quasi-
convexity in the de¯nition here instead because quasi-convexity of the risk measure leads directly to the
notion of convex preferences, and this seems to be the natural way to describe \diversi¯cation favoring"
(in fact, it is unclear what the convexity property on the function directly implies about the preference
relation). We note that convex risk measures are well-studied objects (some examples of convex risk
measures are the certainty equivalent under an exponential utility function and conditional value-at-
risk, both of which will come up repeatedly in later discussions), whereas concave risk measures are not.
We will give some examples of concave risk measures later.
We are now ready to show our main representation result, which states that we may construct all
PSMs via families of risk measures. In everything that follows, we will use the convention sup; = ¡1.
Theorem 1. Consider a function ½ : X ! R [ f¡1;1g in which the neutral, secured and vulnerable
sets of target premia are given by (2). Then, ½ is a prospective satis¯cing measure if and only if there
exists a family of risk measures f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1)nf0gg, nondecreasing in k, i.e., k 7! ¹k(X) is
nondecreasing for all X 2 X, convex if k 2 (0;1), concave if k 2 (¡1;0), and with closed acceptance
sets A¹k for all k 2 (¡1;1)nf0g, such that
½(X) = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : ¹k(X) · 0g: (5)
Moreover, given a prospective satis¯cing measure ½, the underlying risk measure for k 2 Rnf0g is given
by
¹k(X) = inffa : ½(X + a) ¸ kg: (6)
Note that Equation (5) is equivalent to
½(X) = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : X 2 A¹kg:
Moreover, inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that
A¹k = fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg:
11In words, X 2 X is acceptable with respect to ¹k if and only if ½(X) ¸ k.
An intuition for the representation theorem can be gained as follows. If risk measures are used
for selecting among positions, decision makers ¯rst need to choose an index parameter (i.e., the k
in the notation above) and then ¯nd X 2 X with the smallest risk, ¹k(X) (subject to some other
constraints, perhaps). The index k can be seen as an aversion level since the family of risk measures
f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1) n f0gg is non-decreasing in k, i.e., if X has non-positive risk under k (and thus
X 2 A¹k, so X is acceptable under ¹k) then it also has non-positive risk under all k0 · k (and thus
X 2 A¹k0, so X is also acceptable under ¹k0). In other words, decision makers with a smaller index are
willing to accept all positions that are accepted by decision makers with larger k and thus are more risk
tolerant. As a concrete example of this, ¹k could be the negative of the certainty equivalent under an
exponential utility function (CARA), with k being the reciprocal of the risk tolerance parameter. We
refer to this as the entropic risk measure and will discuss it more in the next section.
When using a PSM, however, decision makers specify a target payo® but do not need to pick an
index parameter. They will instead rank positions according to the maximum possible index such that
the risk of falling short of the target at that index value is still acceptable. If a position has a positive
PSM value, then the position is \secured" relative to the target; its risk is acceptable to any risk averse
investor with an index up to ½(X) > 0. On the other hand, if the position has negative PSM, the
position is \vulnerable" relative to the target and is only acceptable to investors who are su±ciently
risk seeking, i.e., those with an index no bigger than ½(X) < 0. We will provide more intuition on PSMs
when we discuss some speci¯c examples in the next section.
2.2 Convex and concave risk measures and associated PSMs
As noted, convex risk measures are well-known objects; this is not the case for concave risk measures.
We can, however, easily construct concave risk measures from convex ones. We now discuss this.
Proposition 3. Consider a family of convex risk measures f¹k : k 2 (0;1)g that is nondecreasing on
k 2 (0;1). Let ¹ ¹k(X) = ¡¹¡k(¡X) for all X 2 X and k 2 (¡1;0). Then, the family of risk measures
f¹ ¹k : k 2 (¡1;0)g is concave and nondecreasing on k 2 (¡1;0). Moreover,
¹ ¹s(X) · ¹t(X) 8s < 0;t > 0:
For our examples of PSMs, we will primarily focus on families of risk measures where the concave
risk measures (k < 0) are derived from convex ones (k > 0) using the construction of Proposition 3.
This motivates the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 5. We say that a family of risk measures f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1)nf0gg has symmetric proper-
ties if
¹k(X) = ¡¹¡k(¡X)
for all X 2 X and k 2 R n f0g.
PSMs generated by families of risk measures with symmetric properties also possess symmetric
properties under additional, mild conditions, as shown in the following proposition.
12Proposition 4. Let f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1)nf0gg be a family of risk measures with symmetric properties,
such that for all non-deterministic X 2 X the function k 7! ¹k(X) is strictly increasing.4 Let ½ be the
corresponding PSM. Then for all X 6= 0 we have
½(¡X) = ¡½(X):
We now provide some examples of concave risk measures derived from convex counterparts, as well as
the associated PSMs. In the ¯rst three examples, we will assume knowledge of an underlying probability
measure P (this could be objective or subjective). In general, it is not necessary to have a pre-speci¯ed
probability measure, as can be seen from above. We will touch upon this issue further when we discuss
PSMs in the context of ambiguity.




lnE [exp(¡kX)] k 6= 0;




k 2 (¡1;1)nf0g :
1
k
lnE [exp(¡kX)] · 0
¾
;
which we call the entropic prospective satis¯cing measure (EPSM). If X is normally distributed with
mean ¹ and standard deviation ¾ under the probability P, then we have ¹ ¹k(X) = ¡¹ + k¾2=2, which
rewards (i.e., has less \risk") for greater variance. In this case, we have ½(X) = 2¹=¾2. Note that the
secured set is those positions with positive mean, and the vulnerable set is those with negative means.
For a ¯xed, positive mean, we prefer smaller variance (risk aversion). If the mean is negative, however,
we prefer larger variance; in this case, the intuition remains that larger variance gives us better hopes
of attaining the target.
Note that the positive part of the above representation yields the entropic satis¯cing measure of
Brown and Sim [5], which is also the reciprocal of the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano [3].
Example 2 (Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) PSM). The family
¹k(X) =
(
CVaRe¡k (X) if k > 0
¡CVaRek (¡X) if k < 0
where










is a symmetric family of nondecreasing risk measures that are coherent5 for k > 0. The PSM given by





supfk > 0 : CVaRe¡k (X) · 0g if E [X] ¸ 0;
supfk < 0 : CVaRek (¡X) ¸ 0g otherwise;
4We say that X 2 X is non-deterministic, if there exist events A;B 2 F such that X(!) 6= X(!
0) for ! 2 A, !
0 2 B.
5In addition to monotonicity, translation invariance and convexity, a coherent risk measure ¹k also satis¯es the positive
homogeneity property, which states that ¹(¸X) = ¸¹(X) for all X 2 X and ¸ ¸ 0.
13which we call the CVaR PSM. A variant of CVaR measure (without the risk seeking part and scaled to







k > 0 :
Á(©¡1(e¡k))
e¡k ¾(X) · E [X]
o
if E [X] ¸ 0;
sup
n
k < 0 :
Á(©¡1(ek))
ek ¾(X) · ¡E [X]
o
otherwise;
where Á and © are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively.
The PSM in this case is a monotonic transformation of the Sharpe ratio (i.e., E [X]=¾(X)).







faln(E [exp(¡X=a)]) + akg if k > 0
sup
a<0
faln(E [exp(¡X=a)]) ¡ akg if k < 0








k > 0 : inf
a>0
falnE [exp(¡X=a)] + akg · 0
¾
if E [X] ¸ 0;
sup
½
k < 0 : sup
a<0
falnE [exp(¡X=a)] ¡ akg · 0
¾
otherwise.









which is again a monotonic transformation of the Sharpe ratio.
Example 4 (General symmetric family). Let ®k be a family of convex functions on the space Q of
probability measures on (­;F), such that ®k is non-increasing in k, and satisfying ®¡k = ¡®k for all
k 2 R. It is well-known (e.g., FÄ ollmer and Schied [15]) that the family of risk measures de¯ned by
¹k(X) = sup
Q2Q
f¡EQ [X] ¡ ®k(Q)g; (7)
for k > 0 is a family of convex risk measures. This family in turn generates the concave family
¹ ¹k(X) = ¡ sup
Q2Q
fEQ [X] ¡ ®¡k(Q)g
= ¡ sup
Q2Q
fEQ [X] + ®k(Q)g
= inf
Q2Q
f¡EQ [X] ¡ ®k(Q)g;
which can be interpreted as the (negative of the) best case penalized expected value over all distributions.





k > 0 : inf
Q2Q




k < 0 : sup
Q2Q
fEQ [X] + ®k(Q)g ¸ 0
))
:
142.3 A distributional perturbation view of prospective satis¯cing
Example 4 suggests a general interpretation of any prospective satis¯cing measure. As discussed, (7)
de¯nes a convex risk measure. In fact, any convex risk measure ¹k can be expressed as
¹k(X) = sup
Q2Q
f¡EQ [X] ¡ ®k(Q)g;
where ®k : Q ! R is a nonnegative convex function on the set Q of probability measures on (­;F).
For simplicity, let us focus on symmetric PSMs. From the example, if ½(X) > 0, we can express it as
½(X) = sup
½
k > 0 : inf
Q2Q
fEQ [X] + ®k(Q)g ¸ 0
¾
;
where ®k is non-increasing in k. This has a natural robustness interpretation in terms of hitting the
target in expectation for all distributions on the probability space. Speci¯cally, one can imagine that
the distribution of X is being chosen by an adversary who is trying to reduce the expected value of X;
this adversary has to pay a nonnegative penalty ®k(Q), however, for any distribution Q they choose.
As k increases, ®k gets smaller and therefore the adversary has more power via a reduced penalty.
½(X) > 0 then represents the most power we can give this adversary such that at that level we still
hit the target in (penalized) expectation for all possible distributions. In this case, ½(X) represents an
index of robustness or security.
On the other hand, if ½(X) < 0, we can write the PSM as
½(X) = sup
(
k < 0 : sup
Q2Q
fEQ [X] + ¹ ®k(Q)g ¸ 0
)
;
where ¹ ®k = ¡®¡k is a non-positive, concave function. The interpretation here is quite di®erent: rather
than being chosen by an adversary, the distribution is being selected by an ally who is looking to ¯nd
any distribution such that X beats the target in expectation. In this case, the expectation is reduced
by the penalty ¹ ®k(Q), which is nondecreasing on k < 0. Now, ½(X) < 0 denotes the largest index level
at which we can penalize this ally such that they can still ¯nd distribution under that X hits the target
in (penalized) expectation. Here X is in the vulnerable set, so the investor cannot hope to be robust;
they are simply looking for some hope of beating the target. In this case, we can think of ½(X) as
signifying an index of fragility or vulnerability.
As a concrete example of this, consider the entropic prospective satis¯cing measure (Example 1) for




















i.e., k¡1 times the relative entropy from Q to P for all distributions Q absolutely continuous with respect
to P (denoted Q ¿ P). Here, ½(X) > 0 means the lower bound










15holds for all distributions Q ¿ P on ­ for any k 2 (0;½(X)]. ½(X) < 0, on the other hand, means the
above lower bound holds for some distribution Q ¿ P for any k 2 (¡1;½(X)].
This interpretation in terms of expected (penalized) payo®s under ambiguity seems interesting in
light of Simon's [37] contention that probabilistic information is often limited for real-world decision
makers.
2.4 Stochastic dominance properties
The PSP properties related to satis¯cing (i.e., attainment content and non-attainment apathy) focus
only on whether a position beats the target or not, but not by how much. As a result, one may think
that in cases when we do have an underlying probability measure P with respect to which stochastic
orders can be de¯ned, it is possible that PSMs violate ¯rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD). In this
section, we show that provided the underlying risk families generating the PSM obey FSD, then so will
the PSM itself. Moreover, for risk measures satisfying second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), the
corresponding PSM will obey SSD over the secured sets and risk-seeking stochastic dominance (RSSD)
over the vulnerable sets.
Finally, we show that these properties will be obeyed by most PSMs of practical interest: namely,
those that depend only on the distribution of the random variable under P. In these cases, we also have
an interpretation for the secured and vulnerable positions as simply those with positive and negative
means, respectively.
We ¯rst recall the de¯nition of the stochastic orders just mentioned. Note that in this section, if
not speci¯ed explicitly, expectations are taken with respect to the probability measure P. We say that
X dominates Y by FSD if and only if E [u(X)] ¸ E [u(Y )] for all nondecreasing functions u and the
inequality is strict for at least one such u; in this case we write X ¸(1) Y . Similarly, X dominates
Y by SSD (respectively RSSD) if and only if E [u(X)] ¸ E [u(Y )] for all u nondecreasing and concave
(respectively convex) and the inequality is strict for at least one such u; in this case we write X ¸(2) Y
(respectively X ¸(¡2) Y ). Alternative equivalent de¯nitions of ¯rst order, second order and risk-seeking
stochastic dominance can be found in Levy [25].
We ¯rst provide a result that will be very helpful for establishing stochastic dominance in the case
of PSPs arising from families of risk measures with symmetric properties.
Proposition 5. Let ¹ be a risk measure and suppose that ¹ preserves FSD, i.e., if X ¸(1) Y then
¹(X) · ¹(Y ). Then the risk measure ¹ ¹(X) = ¡¹(¡X) also preserves FSD. Moreover, if ¹ preserves
SSD, then ¹ ¹ preserves RSSD.
The proposition shows that for symmetric families of risk measures, preservation of ¯rst order
stochastic dominance for the convex risk measures ¹k implies preservation of ¯rst order stochastic
dominance for concave risk measures ¹ ¹k. In addition, when second order stochastic dominance holds
for ¹k, then risk-seeking stochastic dominance follows for ¹ ¹k. In other words, in the case of symmetric
families, we only need to specify stochastic dominance properties for the convex risk measure ¹k in
order to characterize stochastic dominance properties for the whole family of risk measures f¹k : k 2
[¡1;1) n f0gg. Given that convex risk measures are well-studied, Proposition 5 will allow us to use
well-known results to characterize stochastic dominance properties of PSMs.
16For this step, we ¯rst need to show that stochastic dominance properties for PSMs are implied by
those of the associated family of risk measures. We now show this.
Proposition 6. Let f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1) n f0gg be a nondecreasing family of risk measures and let ½ be
the associated PSM. Suppose that ¹k preserves FSD for all k. Then ½ preserves FSD, i.e.,
X ¸(1) Y ) ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ):
Moreover, if ¹k preserves SSD for k > 0 and RSSD for k < 0, then
8X 2 X;Y 2 X++ such that X ¸(2) Y ) ½(X) ¸ ½(Y )
8X 2 X;Y 2 X¡¡ such that X ¸(¡2) Y ) ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ):
In general, convex risk measures do not preserve FSD or SSD, as shown by De Giorgi [9] for the case
of coherent risk measures. Therefore, Proposition 6 is of little help if we do not specify the conditions
on the family of risk measures ¹k such that stochastic dominance is preserved. It is well known that
stochastic dominance orders are fully characterized by the cumulative distribution functions of the
corresponding random variables under the speci¯ed underlying probability measure P (see Levy [25]).
When a risk measure ¹ does not only depend on the distribution functions of the prospects, we can
¯nd two prospects X and Y that only di®er on zero-probability events, but possess di®erent values
for the risk measure, e.g., ¹(X) > ¹(Y ). In this case, we can de¯ne a third prospect Z = X + ²,
0 < ² < ¹(X)¡¹(Y ), which obviously dominates X by FSD (and thus also dominates Y by FSD), but
¹(X) > ¹(X) ¡ ² = ¹(Z) and ¹(Z) = ¹(X) ¡ ² > ¹(Y ). This shows that a necessary property on risk
measures in order to have preservation of stochastic dominance orders is that they only depend on the
probability distribution of the prospect. We thus introduce the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 6. Let P be a probability measure on (­;F). A function f : X ! R is called law-invariant
(with respect to P) if and only if f(X) = f(Y ) whenever X and Y have the same distribution under P,
i.e., PfX(!) · xg = PfY (!) · xg for all x 2 R.
Law-invariance means the underlying mapping between the event space and the premia space is
irrelevant; all that matters is the distribution of the premia under P. It also means that zero-probability
events do not matter, i.e., it might be that two random variables di®er on events A ½ ­, but as long as
PfAg = 0, this does not have any impact on the function f. This is the case for every PSM we discuss
in the context of random variables with given distributions and seems like an eminently reasonable
property, common to most models of decision making under uncertainty.
In our context, law-invariance is very useful because it has implications for stochastic dominance.
Proposition 7. Let (­;F;P) be a atomless probability space.6 If ½ is a law-invariant PSM, then
½ preserves FSD on X, preserves SSD on X++ (secured positions) and RSSD on X¡¡ (vulnerable
positions).
6A probability space (­;F;P) is said to be atomless if there exist no ! 2 ­ such that P[f!g] > 0.
17On atomless probability spaces, law-invariant risk measures also display important boundedness
properties. We say that a convex (concave) risk measure ¹ is bounded from below (above) by the
expectation when ¹(X) ¸ E [¡X] (¹(X) · E [¡X]) for all X 2 X. On atomless probability spaces,
FÄ ollmer and Schied [15] show that law-invariant convex risk measures are bounded from below by the
expectation. This implies that concave risk measures are bounded from above by the expectation.
Namely, if ¹ is law-invariant and concave then ¹(X) = ¡¹(¡X) is law-invariant and convex, thus
¹(X) ¸ E [¡X], or equivalently, ¹(X) · E [¡X]. We now show that bounded properties have important
implications for the structure of the secured and vulnerable sets:
Theorem 2. Let f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1)nf0gg be a nondecreasing family of risk measures and let ½ be the
associated PSM. Assume that for k > 0, ¹k is bounded from below by the expectation and for k < 0, ¹k
is bounded from above by the expectation. Then
E [X] < 0 ) ½(X) · 0
E [X] ¸ 0 ) ½(X) ¸ 0:
If the probability space is not atomless, then it is generally not true that a convex (concave) risk
measure is bounded from below (above). This property has been added by Rockafellar et al. [35] as
an additional property on convex risk measures in order to de¯ne their class of \deviation measures."
In many cases, however, convex (concave) risk measures are bounded from below (above) even if the
probability space is not atomless. This is the case for the convex risk measures of Examples 1-3 discussed
in Section 2.2, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. The underlying families of risk measures in EPSM, CVaR PSM and HEPSM are
bounded by the expectation, i.e., ¹k(X) ¸ E [¡X] for k > 0 and ¹k(X) · E [¡X] for k < 0.
We point out the generality of Theorem 2, which applies not only to any law-invariant PSM on an
atomless probability space, but also to several PSMs on non-atomless spaces as seen in Proposition 8.
Theorem 2 implies that secured target premia possess a nonnegative expected value, i.e., on average
they are at least as good as the target. In contrast, vulnerable target premia possess a negative expected
value, i.e., on average they fail to outperform the target. This provides a simple interpretation of the
\secured" and \vulnerable" sets, respectively.
Theorem 2 also shows an interesting practical advantage of PSMs relative to models of decision
making under uncertainty involving utility functions or subjective distortions of the probability space.
In particular, consider X;Y 2 X with E [X] > 0 > E [Y ]. Note that in order to compute these expected
values we only need to specify the target ¿ and nothing else about the structure of the underlying
risk measures. Theorem 2 implies that any decision maker using a law-invariant PSM, where the
corresponding family of risk measures satis¯es the boundedness properties, will either prefer X to Y or
be indi®erent between the two. Thus, X can be taken as the (weakly) preferred prospect in all cases.
For expected utility maximizers, by contrast, all rankings are possible: the ranking will depend on the
speci¯c structure of the decision maker's utility function, which must therefore ¯rst be speci¯ed.
In such settings, therefore, the decision maker using a PSM can immediately simplify their decision
problem by disregarding prospects with negative expected payo®s.
183 PSPs and connections to Allais
In this section, we show how choice under PSPs can be consistent with some of the classical patterns
of observed preferences noted famously by Allais [1]. Such observed preferences are impossible under
classical expected utility theory due to a strong requirement known as the independence axiom. In
contrast, PSPs can consistently \explain" such choices over fairly wide ranges of targets.
We begin with a speci¯c pair of gambles and show computational results using several PSMs, then
shift our focus to more general statements using the entropic PSM.
3.1 A speci¯c Allais example
Consider the following two sets of gambles:
² Gamble A: Wins $500,000 for sure.
² Gamble B: 1% chance of 0, 10% chance of winning $2,500,000 and 89% chance of winning $500,000.
and
² Gamble C: 90% chance of 0, 10% chance of winning $2,500,000.
² Gamble D: 89% chance of 0, 11% chance of winning $500,000.
The most typical pattern of preferences observed among actual decision makers is to choose A over B
and C over D. It is not hard to see that this is inconsistent with traditional expected utility theory with
any utility function.
In contrast, these choice pairs can in fact be consistent with choice under a PSM over a speci¯c
range of a ¯xed target. For instance, let ½ be any law-invariant PSM and let ¿ be the target. We further
assume that the corresponding family of risk measures satis¯es the boundedness properties of Theorem
2. Denoting gamble A by XA, we have, for ¿ · $500,000, ½(XA ¡¿) = 1, so XA ¡¿ º XB ¡¿. On the
other hand, the expected value of gamble C is $250,000 and the expected value of gamble D is $55,000;
therefore, using Theorem 2, for ¿ > $55,000, ¿ < $250,000, we have ½(XC ¡¿) ¸ 0 ¸ ½(XD ¡¿), so the
observed pattern above is (weakly) resolved over ¿ 2 ($55;000;$250;000).
In fact, for many PSMs, this pattern of preferences will be observed over an even larger range of
targets. This is shown in Tables 1-3 for EPSM, HEPSM, and CVaR PSM, respectively.
In all three cases, gamble A is strictly preferred to gamble B for ¿ · $500,000, and gamble C is
strictly preferred to gamble D for ¿ 2 (¿;$2;000;000), for some 0 < ¿ < $55;000. The intuition in
the ¯rst pair is that gamble A is guaranteed to hit the $500,000 target; for the second pair, as long
as the target is not very small, the extra \upside" of $2,500,000 versus $500,000 outweighs the small
di®erence in probabilities of zero payo®s. It seems plausible that this type of intuition is being used by
the decision makers who make such choices.7
7It is worth mentioning that the imposition of some risk-seeking behavior, as we have done, is unnecessary to address
the example of Allais; the resolution would still hold without this, but over a target range that is quite smaller.
193.2 Common consequence e®ect
We now brie°y generalize the above pattern over a pair of choices. The e®ect above, ¯rst pointed out
by Allais [1], is typically called the common consequence e®ect.
Formally, consider two positive payo®s x > y > 0 and two probabilities q 2 (0;1), p 2 (0;1), with
q > p. As before, we denote the ¯rst pair of gambles XA and XB. XA is a sure payo® of y; XB, on the
other hand, pays o® x with probability p, y with probability 1 ¡ q, and 0 with probability q ¡ p.
The second pair is a pair of all-or-nothing gambles, which we denote XC and XD. XC pays o® x
with probability p and 0 otherwise; XD pays o® y with probability q and 0 otherwise. We will assume
XC beats XD in expectation, i.e., px > qy, though we could remove this assumption in what follows.
In observed choices, particularly when x is considerably larger than y and q ¡ p is small, real-world
decision makers often prefer the \safer" choice among the ¯rst two gambles (i.e., the sure payo® of XA
over the risky payo® XB) and the \riskier" choice among the second two gambles (i.e., XC over XD).
The rationale, presumably, is along the lines that XA o®ers a sure payo®, whereas XB can result in a
zero payo®; for the second pair, though XC has a slightly higher chance of paying o® nothing, this extra
risk may well be worth bearing if the di®erence x ¡ y is large.
This is easily seen to be inconsistent with expected utility theory. Let u be any utility function,
normalized to u(0) = 0. Then strict preference of XA over XB implies u(y) > pu(x) + (1 ¡ q)u(y) )
qu(y) > pu(x); on the other hand, strict preference of XC over XD implies pu(x) > qu(y), a contradic-
tion. This occurs, fundamentally, because of the independence axiom, which imposes the requirement
that common components of any two gambles be irrelevant to the direction of preference. In e®ect, this
strong requirement forces decision makers to be una®ected by the context surrounding their choices.
Let us make this more speci¯c. If we consider a gamble XE that pays x with probability p=q and
0 with probability (q ¡ p)=q. Then we see that XB is the gamble that pays XA with probability 1 ¡ q
and XE with probability q. Similarly, XC pays XE with probability q and 0 with probability 1¡q, and
XD pays XA with probability q and 0 with probability 1 ¡ q. With this decomposition, we see that
the independence axiom requires that XA be (strictly) preferred to XB if and only if XA be (strictly)
preferred to XE, and XC be (strictly) preferred to XD if and only if XE be (strictly) preferred to XA.
Thus, strict preference of XA over XB and XC over XD violates the independence axiom.
We show that the common consequence e®ect can be explained by PSM over an explicit range of
targets; we show a formal result for entropic PSM. As in the example in the previous subsection, the
result will hold for other PSMs, too.
Proposition 9. Consider the two pairs of gambles, (XA;XB) and (XC;XD), as described above with
px > qy and let ½ denote the entropic prospective satis¯cing measure and ¹k denote the entropic risk
measure at level k. Then for every (x;y;p;q) as above, there exists a target ¿(x;y;p;q) = ¿? < qy such
that for all ¿ 2 (¿?;y], ½(XA ¡ ¿) > ½(XB ¡ ¿) and ½(XC ¡ ¿) > ½(XD ¡ ¿). Moreover, we have
¿? = ¡¹½?(XD);
where ½? is the unique ½ > 0 such that ¹½(XC) = ¹½(XD).
Notice that the entropic PSM is closely linked to an expected utility representation with an expo-
nential function (CARA utility). Despite this close connection, however, the implications for choice
may be drastically di®erent than those implied by expected utility theory.
203.3 Common ratio e®ect
The common ratio e®ect is another well-known pattern of many observed preferences, again famously
pointed out by Allais [1], that cannot be captured by expected utility theory. This phenomenon is
again found in the preferences typically observed over two pairs of gambles. Consider two positive real
numbers x > y > 0 and two probabilities q 2 (0;1), p 2 (0;1).
We denote the ¯rst pair of gambles by XA and XB. The ¯rst, XA, involves a sure bet of y. The
second, XB, pays o® x with probability p and 0 with probability 1 ¡ p.
The second pair of gambles, XC and XD, involves two risky bets: XC pays o® x with probability
p(1 ¡ q) and 0 otherwise; XD pays o® y < x with probability 1 ¡ q and 0 otherwise. Note that we
can view both of these as a composition of two biased coin °ips; ¯rst, a coin with probability 1 ¡ q of
getting a head (i.e., a positive payo®), then a coin with probability p of getting a head. XC pays o®
x if both coins get heads; XD pays o® y if the ¯rst coin gets a head regardless of the outcome of the
second coin. Note that, conditional on the ¯rst coin getting a head, XC and XD o®er the exact same
gambles as XA and XB.
It is not uncommon for real-world decision makers to prefer XA over XB while also preferring XC
over XD. For instance, consider p = :8, q = :75, x = 16, and y = 10. Many subjects prefer the sure
payo® of y = 10 over the 80% chance of x = 16 in the ¯rst case; in the second case, however, even
though XC o®ers a lower chance of a positive payo® (20% vs. 25%), the extra upside of x = 16 vs.
y = 10 is well worth the extra 5% chance of zero payo®.
Again, it is easy to see that such a pattern of preferences is inconsistent with expected utility
theory. Normalizing u(0) = 0, the ¯rst preference implies u(y) > pu(x); the second preference implies
p(1 ¡ q)u(x) > (1 ¡ q)u(y) ) pu(x) > u(y), a contradiction. Once again, expected utility theory (via
the independence axiom) imposes the strong requirement that \common components" of gambles must
be irrelevant across sets of choices, and that to make choices otherwise is irrational. In this case, it
hardly seems irrational to take into account common components. If there is already a high chance of
getting zero payo®, as is true in the second pair of gambles, it does not necessarily seem unreasonable
for a decision maker to be willing to tolerate a slightly higher risk of no payo® for substantially enough
higher upside. This may not, however, be true in the ¯rst case, when XA is sure to payo® y.
We now show that this e®ect can in general be captured by PSM over an explicit range of targets.
As with the common consequence e®ect, we prove the result for entropic PSM.
Proposition 10. Consider the two pairs of gambles, (XA;XB) and (XC;XD), as described above and
let ½ denote the entropic prospective satis¯cing measure and ¹k denote the entropic risk measure at
level k. Then for every (x;y;p;q) as above, there exists a target ¿(x;y;p;q) = ¿? < y such that for all
¿ 2 (¿?;y), ½(XA ¡ ¿) > ½(XB ¡ ¿) and ½(XC ¡ ¿) > ½(XD ¡ ¿). Moreover, we have
¿? = ¡¹½?(XD)
½? = ½(XB ¡ y):
Notice that when px = y, i.e., both pairs of gambles are equal in expectation, we obtain ½? = 0 and
thus ¿? = E [XD] = (1¡q)y. When px > y, the decision maker will prefer XC over XD for some targets
strictly less than (1 ¡ q)y. When px < y, there is still a range of targets for which XC is preferred,




















Figure 1: The threshold targets ¿? from Proposition 10 for various (x;p) for the case y = 10, q = :75.
The solid black line shows the crossover value of E [XD] = (1 ¡ q)y = 2:5 for which the satis¯cing
prospective measure switches from risk avoidance below to risk seeking above.
but ¿? > (1 ¡ q)y; in this case, the risk-seeking part of the satis¯cing measure is at work, and decision
makers must have an appreciably high target such that the extra upside provided by XC is worth it.
Figure 1 shows a numerical example of how ¿? varies as x and p vary for the case y = 10 and
q = :75. As x or p get larger, the range of targets over which XC is preferred to XD becomes wider,
which squares with intuition.
3.4 Re°ection e®ect
The common ratio e®ect as discussed above asserts that increasing the chances of the worst outcome
(i.e., zero above) tends to push people from the \safer" choice to the \riskier" choice. Kahneman and
Tversky [21], in their seminal paper, have observed in such situations that if all payo®s are re°ected
around zero, that the opposite pattern of preference reversal occurs: namely, an uncertain chance of a
larger loss tends to be preferred to a sure loss of smaller magnitude, but as the chances of a zero (no
loss) outcome are increased in equal proportion, subjects tend to reverse preferences towards the \less
risky" choice. Obviously, this preference reversal is equally inconsistent with expected utility theory.
The numbers used by Kahneman and Tversky [21] in their Problems 3 and 4 to identify the re°ection
e®ect are y = 3;000, x = 4;000, p = :8, and q = :75. The following preferences were typically observed:
XA = (3000;1) Â XB = (4;000;:8)
XC = (3000;:25) Á XD = (4;000;:2);
where (x;p) is a prospect paying x with probability p and 0 else, contrasted with the following, which
were also typically observed:
¡XA = (¡3;000;1) Á ¡XB = (¡4;000;:8)
¡XC = (¡3;000;:25) Â ¡XD = (¡4;000;:2):
The gambles ¡XA;¡XB;¡XC and ¡XD are the re°ections around zero of gambles XA;XB;XC and
XD, respectively. We now argue that this alternation of preferences is possible using symmetric PSMs
















































Figure 2: Entropic PSM values for gambles XC and XD (left panel) described in the main text as
function of the target ¿, and for their re°ections ¡XC and ¡XD around zero (right panel).
with negative targets. In particular, recall that the family of risk measures ¹k has symmetric properties if
¹¡k(¡X) = ¡¹k(X) for all k 2 Rnf0g. If the PSM is given by a family of risk measures with symmetric
properties, then Proposition 4 shows that ½(¡X) = ¡½(X) for X 6= 0 if the function k ! ¹k(X) is
strictly increasing for non-deterministic X. In this case, then, if the following (as, for example, in
Proposition 10 above) holds,
8¿ 2 (¿?;y) :
"
½(XA ¡ ¿) > ½(XB ¡ ¿)




8¿ 2 (¡y;¡¿?) :
"
½(¡XB ¡ ¿) > ½(¡XA ¡ ¿)
½(¡XD ¡ ¿) > ½(¡XC ¡ ¿)
#
also holds. Figure 2 (left panel) shows the entropic PSM values as a function of the target ¿ for the
second pair of gambles XC and XD, and for their re°ections around zero (right panel). Note that for
XC and XD the target ¿? de¯ned in Proposition 10 is approximately 640.
A key issue here, obviously, is target formation; in order for PSP to \explain" such patterns, the
targets need to be formed endogenously (i.e., they must be di®erent for the original gambles and their
re°ected counterparts). We will come back to this point at the end of Section 4. What we have shown
here, though, is that if the targets are su±ciently far away from zero (e.g., ¿ > 640 for the positive
gambles and ¿ < ¡640 for their re°ected counterparts), then the entropic PSM is consistent with these
kinds of preference reversals and their re°ections. As before, a similar story with di®erent threshold
targets would be true for other PSMs.
4 PSPs, ambiguity, and Ellsberg
In this section, we will show that PSPs can be consistent with behavioral choices when the probability
distributions of uncertain payo®s are unknown. Ellsberg's [12] famous experiments provide interesting
23insights that decisions made under distributional ambiguity can be inconsistent with the standard
paradigm of expected utility and the subjective expected utility theory of Savage [36]. We will show
that the PSP model can be extended to accommodate distributional ambiguity and show that it can
resolve Ellsberg's paradoxes across a fairly wide range of targets.
To encompass ambiguity in PSPs, we now con¯ne the probability measure to a family of distributions,
Q. Intuitively speaking, the greater the size of the family Q, the greater the level of distributional
ambiguity. In particular, if the family is a singleton, i.e., Q = fPg, then the underlying probability
measure is unambiguously speci¯ed.
Distributional ambiguity has already been studied in convex risk measures (see FÄ ollmer and Schied,
[15]), which are the building blocks of PSMs. Given a law-invariant family of risk measures, ¹P;k(X),
evaluated under the probability measure P, we can extend this to family of risk measures to encompass




which retains the convexity of the risk measure. For k < 0, the concave counterpart is given by
¹ ¹k(X) = inf
Q2Q
¹ ¹Q;k(X);
which corresponds to an ambiguity favoring risk measure. Therefore, we can extend versions of the
CVaR, entropic, and homogenized entropic risk measures to encompass distributional ambiguity in
straightforward fashion.
Theorem 3. Given a law-invariant family of risk measures, ¹Q;k(X) (normalized, convex for k > 0,
concave for k < 0) with ¹Q;k(X) ¸ EQ [¡X] if k > 0 and ¹Q;k(X) · EQ [¡X] if k < 0, de¯ne the
corresponding, law-invariant PSM








¹Q;k(X) if k > 0
inf
Q2Q
¹Q;k(X) if k < 0
Then the following implications hold:
9Q 2 Q : EQ [X] < 0 ) ½(X) · 0
9Q 2 Q : EQ [X] ¸ 0 ) ½(X) ¸ 0:
Observe that if there exist Q1;Q2 2 Q such that EQ1 [X] < 0 and EQ2 [X] ¸ 0, then X is in the
neutral set of target premia, i.e., ½(X) = 0.
4.1 Ellsberg's two-color experiment
The setup for Ellsberg's two-color experiment is as follows. Box 1 contains 50 red balls and 50 blue
balls. Box 2 contains red and blue balls in unknown proportions. In the ¯rst test, subjects are given
the following two choices:
24² Gamble A: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 1 is red.
² Gamble B: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 2 is red.
In the second test, subjects have to decide between the two choices:
² Gamble C: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 1 is blue.
² Gamble D: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 2 is blue.
In the experimental ¯ndings, the majority of subjects are ambiguity averse and strictly prefer gamble
A over gamble B and gamble C over gamble D, while a smaller portion are actually ambiguity favoring
and strictly prefer gamble B over gamble A and gamble D over gamble C. Ellsberg argues the exper-
imental ¯ndings are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. The reasoning is as follows:
for EUT, individuals who strictly prefer gamble A over gamble B must perceive that in Box 2, red balls
are fewer in number than blue ones. In doing so, they would prefer gamble D over gamble C, but this
is inconsistent with the experimental ¯ndings.
Under Theorem 2, if the corresponding risk measures satisfy the boundedness properties, a PSM
on gambles A and C yields non-negative or non-positive values when the target is below or above $50,
respectively. For speci¯c PSMs, such as those based on CVaR, entropic and homogenized entropic risk
measures, the induced satis¯cing levels are strictly positive or negative when the target is below or
above $50, respectively. In contrast, Theorem 3 implies that for any target between $0 and $100, these
PSMs on gambles B and D, which have unknown distributions, are neutral and have satis¯cing levels
valued at zero. Therefore, the preference induced by these PSMs are consistent with the experimental
observations.
Clearly, Ellsberg's paradox can also be resolved by convex or concave risk measures or by worst-
case or best-case expected utility under ambiguity depending on whether the individuals are ambiguity
averse or favoring (see, e.g., FÄ ollmer and Schied [15] or Gilboa and Schmeidler [18]). The di®erence
here, however, is that PSMs suggest that the ambiguity preferences depend on the aspiration levels of
the subjects. We conjecture that this is important in accurately describing decision maker behavior.
For instance, if the payo®s in the setup of Ellsberg are increased to $10,000, we may expect subjects
who are ambiguity seeking for $100 could possibly switch to ambiguity averse behavior. We have found
this to be the case in some informal experiments with hypothetical payo®s (it is costly to implement
such an experiment with real payo®s!). It would be interesting to somehow examine this issue with
rigorous experimentation.
4.2 Ellsberg's three-color experiment
In the three color experiment, a box contains 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls with unknown
proportions. In the ¯rst test, subjects choose between the following gambles:
² Gamble A: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is black or yellow.
² Gamble B: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is red or yellow.
In the second test, they have to decide between the two choices:
25² Gamble C: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is black.
² Gamble D: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is red.
In gamble A, the probability of winning the $300 prize is 2/3 and the expected payo® is $200. In
contrast, the probability of winning the same prize in gamble B ranges from 1/3 to 1. In gamble C, the
probability of winning the prize ranges from 0 to 2/3. On the other hand, the probability of winning in
gamble D is exactly 1/3 and the expected payo® is $100.
Subjective expected utility theory postulates that individuals who prefer gamble A over gamble B
should also prefer gamble C over gamble D. Ellsberg's experiment reveals, however, that individuals
who prefer gamble A over gamble B also tended to prefer gamble D over gamble C; likewise, Ellsberg
found that individuals who preferred gamble B over gamble A also tended to prefer gamble C over
gamble D.
We present in Table 4 the satis¯cing levels for all the gambles evaluated using the ambiguity version
of the PSMs based on entropic, homogenized entropic and CVaR risk measures. The preferences induced
by these PSMs are the same. Gamble A is preferred over gamble B if the target is less than $200 and a
reversal of preference occurs when the target exceeds $200. On the other hand, gamble D is preferred
over gamble C if the target falls below $100 and a reversal of preference occurs when the target exceeds
$100. To reconcile Ellsberg's experimental ¯ndings, some subjects would have to have targets below
$100, while others would need targets above $200.
These PSMs state that individuals with targets between $100 to $200 would prefer gamble A over
gamble B and gamble C over gamble D. Such pattern of preferences, however, was not mentioned in
Ellsberg's experiment. It is likely that the targets for both experiments may di®er since individuals may
form their targets only after they have reviewed the di®erent opportunities available. The payo®s in the
¯rst test may be perceived to be better than the second test. As such, it does not seem unreasonable
for individuals to lower their aspiration levels in the second test. While this explanation seems plausible
(see also Simon [37] on how people form targets in the housing market), further experiments on how
people form targets are needed. We refer here to a recent literature on this issue; see, for example,
KÄ oszegi and Rabin [22, 23].
5 Optimizing PSMs and a portfolio choice example
In this section, we show that PSMs can be e±ciently optimized over a convex set of random variables, a
decision problem that arises in many contexts, including portfolio optimization. This is an advantage for
PSMs relative to models of choice under risk that gain descriptive richness by means of, say, a weighting
function applied on the cumulative distribution function, as the rank-dependent utility model (RDU) of
Quiggin [33] and the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman [38]. Indeed, in these
models, probability weighting depends on the ranking of states of the world, and the ranking changes
as di®erent convex combinations of the random variable are chosen. Consequently, in the context of
optimization problems, the weighting of the cumulative distribution function can be di±cult to handle
and in many applications of RDU or CPT it is ignored, losing the descriptive richness that was the very
motivation for the model in the ¯rst place.
26In contrast, these issues do not arise with PSMs, as we show in this section. We consider the problem
of portfolio choice with our model. The use of PSM in a portfolio selection context may be natural in
a setting when a manager has high incentives to outperform a pre-speci¯ed benchmark, particularly a
very aggressive one.
Speci¯cally, given a PSM ½, we consider the problem
z¤ = supf½(X) : X 2 Xg; (8)
where X is the convex hull f
Pn
i=1 wi Xi :
Pn
i=1 wi = 1;wi ¸ 0; 8i = 1;:::;ng of n random variables
X1;:::;Xn, which give the target premium over a given target ¿. From a computational perspective,
¯nding a feasible solution in a convex set is relatively easy compared to ¯nding a feasible solution in a
non-convex one. Observe that for k > 0, the following set
S(k) = fX : ½(X) ¸ k; X 2 Xg;
which can be empty, is convex. If the secured set is nonempty, i.e., X++ 6= ;, we can e±ciently obtain
the optimal solution to Problem (8) using the binary search procedure of Brown and Sim [5]. Otherwise,
if the secured set is empty, we have z¤ · 0. Moreover, each of the extreme points Xi must either be
in the neutral or vulnerable set. If one of them, say Xj, is in the neutral set, then if the secured set is
empty, ½(Xj) = 0 attains the highest satis¯cing value over X. Suppose instead that Xi, i = 1;:::;n,





and we can simply enumerate the PSM values for the n extreme points and choose the largest one in
this case.
We now consider an asset allocation problem in which the underlying distributions of assets' returns
are not known exactly. Consider n assets with independently distributed returns Vi, i = 1;:::;n. The
exact distribution of Vi is unknown but can be characterized by its support [vi;vi], i.e., the probability
that Vi belongs to [vi;vi] is one. Also, the mean of Vi is unknown and lies in [ºi;ºi] µ [vi;vi]. We then











wi ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n:
where ¿ is a give target return.
Note that for any target ¿ (which, again, may be random) and portfolio
Pn
i=1 wi Vi, the portfolio's
excess return over the target corresponds to (
P
i=1 wi Vi) ¡ ¿ =
Pn
i=1 wi (Vi ¡ ¿) =
Pn
i=1 wi Xi, where
Xi = Vi ¡ ¿ is the excess return of asset i = 1;:::;n. When ¿ is ¯xed, Xi possesses a unknown
distribution with support [vi ¡¿;vi ¡¿] and unknown mean in [ºi ¡¿;ºi ¡¿]. We denote these bounds
by xi = vi ¡ ¿, xi = vi ¡ ¿, ¹
i = ºi ¡ ¿ and ¹i = ºi ¡ ¿, respectively.
27We restrict our analysis to the case of an entropic prospective satis¯cing measure in which the







for k > 0 and k < 0, and F is the set of probability measures on (­;F) such that X possesses a feasible
distribution (with the given support [x;x] and mean in the corresponding interval [¹;¹]).
Proposition 11. Let X be a random variable with support [x;x] and F be the set of all admissible





pexp(ax) + q exp(ax) if a ¸ 0
pexp(ax) + q exp(ax) otherwise,
where p = (x ¡ ¹)=(x ¡ x), q = 1 ¡ p, p = (x ¡ ¹)=(x ¡ x) and q = 1 ¡ p.
Given a target ¿, Proposition 11 enables us to compute the EPSM under the given distributional
ambiguity. Suppose ½(Vi ¡¿) < 0 for all i, then all assets are in the vulnerable set and concentration is












k > 0;wi ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n;









a > 0;wi ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n;
which is a convex optimization problem, and hence can be solved, in high dimension, e±ciently using
interior point methods.8
We now present a numerical example based on the information presented in Table 5. Note that the
asset returns are de¯ned in such a way that asset 1 is a risk-free asset that pays 2% in all states of the
world. Assets 2 to 6 are risky assets, with asset 2 being the one with lowest downside and upside and
asset 6 being the one the highest downside and upside. We solve the optimal asset allocation for various
8For this example, it is convenient to use a solver that can explicitly handle the \exponential cone"; here we use the
software package ROME [17] to solve our example problem.
28targets as presented in Table 6. The lowest target corresponds to the risk-free asset. In this case, the
investor can reach the target for sure by investing in asset 1. As the target increases, the risk-free asset
1 becomes less attractive, because it fails to attain the target with certainty. The investor puts some of
their wealth into the risky assets. If the target becomes very high, i.e., the investor is very ambitious,
then they only hold asset 6, the asset with the highest upside potential and a positive probability to be
above the target.
This example highlights the intuitive idea that if the investor possesses a high target return, then they
will be willing to take more risk. This pattern is similar to that observed in mutual fund managers during
the technology bubble of the 1990's and discussed in Dass et al. [7]. Managers with high contractual
incentives to rank at the top (i.e., those with a high target) adopted the risky and aggressive strategy
to not invest in bubble stocks, as this was the only way to outperform the market. Such a strategy also
carried with it a high probability of ranking at the bottom if the bubble continued. In contrast, mutual
fund managers with a high incentive to follow the benchmark (i.e., those mainly concerned about not
ranking at the bottom, thus with a low target) adopted the less risky strategy to follow the bubble
(herding), which yields a small probability of ranking at the bottom. While the observation of Dass et
al. [7] suggests that fund managers' decisions may be target-based, we do not want to overemphasize
here the ability of PSPs to explain real portfolio choices. Addressing portfolio selection and asset pricing
implications of PSPs seems like an interesting subject for future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed prospective satis¯cing preferences, a target-based model of risky
choice. Our model has several interesting features. First, we obtained a representation theorem that
has practical relevance, since it links our framework to a more standard de¯nition of a risk measure.
In addition, under mild assumptions, the PSP model preserves ¯rst-order stochastic dominance over all
premia, second-order stochastic dominance over secured premia, and risk-seeking second-order stochastic
dominance over vulnerable premia. Moreover, PSPs can address several observed violations of expected
utility theory, thus also displaying considerable descriptive power. Finally, the model is amenable to
computationally e±cient optimization.
There are a number of interesting directions for future research. One direction is to consider the use
of the PSP model in various applications, such as portfolio choice or environments involving competition.
It would be interesting to see what implications the model has for market portfolios and equilibrium
behavior. Second, it would be useful to have more detailed experimental work that tests the implications
of the model and examines elicitation of targets.
Finally, and related to this, is further investigation of the descriptive power of the PSP model.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that suggests that performance relative to a target payo®
is a critical factor driving the decision making of many individuals. We have found that the PSP
model can also explain some recently observed \puzzles" in decision theory, in addition to the classical
ones discussed earlier. For instance, Machina [27] recently pointed out that rank-dependent preferences
that resolve the classical Ellsberg example can still struggle with other \Ellsberg-like" examples due
to a required separability property. It turns out PSPs do not impose such separability and therefore
29can address these instances. As another example, Wu and Markle [40] have recently pointed out that
people demonstrate systematic violations of double matching, which is necessary for the representation
of cumulative prospect theory and states that if a decision maker is indi®erent between both the tail
gains and tail losses of two gambles, then they must be indi®erent between the composition of these two
tails as well. One can verify that PSPs need not obey this stringent requirement of gain-loss separability
either. What we ¯nd appealing is that the PSP model is fairly simple to motivate and not done with
any particular descriptive intent in mind, yet it still can readily accommodate a fairly wide array of
phenomena that seem to be present in the decision making of many individuals.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let º be a prospective satis¯cing preference relation. Property 1 implies the existence of an upper
semi-continuous function ~ ½ : X ! R such that X º Y if and only if ~ ½(X) ¸ ~ ½(Y ) (Theorem 4, Bosi and
Mehta [4]).
Monotonicity for ~ ½ follows directly from Property 2 (that is, monotonicity of º).
Property 3 implies that ~ ½ is constant and maximal on fX 2 X : X ¸ 0g and constant and minimal
on fX 2 X : X < 0g. Assume that ~ ½(X) = ~ ½u for all X ¸ 0 and ~ ½(X) = ~ ½l for all X < 0, then Property
3 also implies ~ ½(Y ) 2 [~ ½l; ~ ½u] for all Y 2 X.
Property 4 implies that ~ ½ is constant on X0. Assume ~ ½(X) = ½0 for all X 2 X0, then Property 4
also implies that ~ ½(X) < ~ ½0 for all X 2 X¡¡ and ~ ½(X) > ~ ½0 for all X 2 X++. From this it follows that
~ ½u > ~ ½0 > ~ ½l.
Property 4(i) implies quasi-concavity9 for ~ ½ on X++ and Property 4(ii) implies quasi-convexity for
~ ½ on X¡¡.
Let ½(X) = g(~ ½(X)) ¡ g(~ ½0) where g : R ! R [ f¡1;1g is de¯ned as follows:
g(x) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¡1 x = ~ ½l
1
~ ½l¡x x 2 (~ ½l; ~ ½0]
1
~ ½u¡x + 1
~ ½l¡~ ½0 ¡ 1
~ ½u¡~ ½0 x 2 (~ ½0; ~ ½u)
1 x = ~ ½u
Since g is strictly increasing, it preserves the ordering of ~ ½ and ½ satis¯es properties (i), (ii) and (iii)(a).
Moreover, since g is continuous, ½ is also upper semi-continuous, quasi-concave on X++ and quasi-convex
on X¡¡. This proves the existence of ½ with properties (i)-(iv).
On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that a upper semi-continuous function ½ : X !
R\f¡1;1g with properties (i)-(iv) de¯nes a prospective satis¯cing preference relation º with X º Y
if and only if ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ). Note that when ½ is upper semi-continuous, then it follows from Bosi and
Mehta [4] that º satis¯es Properties (i) and (ii) in Property 1.
9Assume wlog that X º Y . Then ¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y º Y , so ½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¸ ½(Y ) = min(½(X);½(Y )); an analogous
argument follows for quasi-convexity on X¡¡.
32Proof of Proposition 2
Clearly, all convex functions are also quasi-convex. It su±ces to show that a quasi-convex function that
satis¯es translation invariance is always convex. We have:
¹(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¡ (¸¹(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹(Y ))
= ¹(¸(X + ¹(X)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹(Y ))
· maxf¹(X + ¹(X));¹(Y + ¹(Y ))g
= maxf0;0g = 0:
Hence,
¹(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · ¸¹(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹(Y ):
That a quasi-concave function that satis¯es translation invariance is always concave follows by a an
analogous argument.
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose ½ takes the form (5) and ¹k is the family of risk measures described in Theorem 1; we will
show that ½ is a prospective satis¯cing measure.
1. Upper semi-continuity:
Upper semi-continuity for ½ is equivalent to fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg being closed for all k. Let
k 2 (¡1;1)nf0g and take a sequence (Xn)n in fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg such that Xn ! X as
n ! 1. Since ½(Xn) ¸ k, then ¹k(Xn) · 0. Therefore, the sequence (Xn)n belongs to the
acceptance set A¹k. Since A¹k is closed, than X 2 A¹k, i.e., ¹k(X) · 0. This implies ½(X) ¸ k,
i.e., X 2 fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg. This proves that fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg is closed for all k, and thus
½ is upper semi-continuous.
2. Monotonicity:
Follows clearly from monotonicity of the underlying risk measures.
3. Satis¯cing behavior:
(a) Attainment content:
Note that if X ¸ 0, then monotonicity for ¹k implies ¹k(X) · ¹k(0) = 0, for all k 2 Rnf0g.
Hence, ½(X) = 1.
(b) Non-attainment apathy:
If X < 0, there exists ² < 0 such that X · ². Hence, monotonicity for ¹k implies ¹k(X) ¸
¹k(²) = ¡² > 0 for all k 2 Rnf0g; therefore, fk : ¹k(X) · 0g = ;, so ½(X) = supfg = ¡1
(by our convention that sup; = ¡1).
4. Prospective behavior:
(a) Superiority of secured target premia and inferiority of vulnerable target premia:
Follows by de¯nition of the secured, vulnerable, and neutral sets in (2).
33(b) Quasi-concavity over secured target premia:
Let X;Y 2 X++ and k¤ = minf½(X);½(Y )g > 0. Note that ¹k(X) · 0 and ¹k(Y ) · 0 for
all k 2 (0;k¤). Then, using convexity of ¹k on k > 0, we have
½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : ¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · 0g
¸ supfk 2 (0;1) : ¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · 0g
¸ supfk 2 (0;1) : ¸¹k(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹k(Y ) · 0g
¸ k¤
= minf½(X);½(Y )g:
(c) Quasi-convexity over vulnerable target premia:
Let X;Y 2 X¡¡ and k¤ = maxf½(X);½(Y )g < 0. Note that ¹k(X);¹k(Y ) > 0 for all k > k¤.
Hence, for all k 2 (k¤;0),
¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) ¸ ¸¹k(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹k(Y ) > 0:
Since ¹k is nondecreasing in k, the above inequality also holds for k > k¤. Therefore, we
have
½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : ¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · 0g
= supfk 2 (¡1;k¤] : ¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · 0g
· k¤
= maxf½(X);½(Y )g:
For the other direction, let ¹k take the form (6) in which ½ is a prospective satis¯cing measure. By
monotonicity of ½, it is clear that ¹k is nondecreasing on k. To verify that ¹k is a risk measure with a
closed acceptance set, we note the following:
1. Closed acceptance set:
We show that ¹k(X) · 0 is equivalent to ½(X) ¸ k. One direction is trivial, i.e., when ½(X) ¸ k
then ¹k(X) · 0. For the other direction, we note that upper semi-continuity for ½ implies upper
semi-continuity for a ! ½(X +a), for all X 2 X. Moreover, since a ! ½(a+X) is also increasing
due to the monotonicity of ½, then it is also right-continuous and the limit of Problem (6) is
achievable. It follows that when ¹k(X) · 0, then there exists an a · 0 such that ½(a + X) ¸ k.
Due to monotonicity of ½ we also have ½(X) ¸ k. We have thus showed:
A¹k = fX 2 X : ¹k(X) · 0g = fX 2 X : ½(X) ¸ kg:




For all c 2 R,
¹k(X + c) = inffa : ½(X + c + a) ¸ kg
= inffa ¡ c : ½(X + a) ¸ kg
= ¹k(X) ¡ c:
4. Convexity on k > 0:
Given X; Y 2 X, notice that, by monotonicity of ½ and the de¯nition of ¹k, we have for all ² > 0,
½(X + ¹k(X) + ²) ¸ k
and
½(Y + ¹k(Y ) + ²) ¸ k:
Since k > 0, we have X + ¹k(X) + ²;Y + ¹k(Y ) + ² 2 X++. For every ¸ 2 [0;1], de¯ne
a¸ , ¸¹k(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹k(Y ):
Then, for all ² > 0,
½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y + a¸ + ²) = ½(¸(X + ¹k(X) + ²) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹k(Y ) + ²))
¸ minf½(X + ¹k(X) + ²);½(Y + ¹k(Y ) + ²)g
¸ k > 0:
Then
¹k(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) = inf fa : ½(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y + a) ¸ kg
· a¸
= ¸¹k(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹k(Y ):
5. Concavity on k < 0:
Since ¹k(X) = inffa : ½(X+a) ¸ kg, it follows that ½(X+¹k(X)+a) < k < 0 and ½(Y +¹k(Y )+
a) < k < 0 for all a < 0. Therefore, for all a < 0, X+¹k(X)+a 2 X¡¡, and Y +¹k(Y )+a 2 X¡¡;
hence,
½(¸(X + ¹k(X)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹k(Y )) + a) · maxf½(X + ¹k(X) + a);½(Y + ¹k(Y ) + a)g < k
for all ¸ 2 [0;1]. Therefore,
¹k(¸(X + ¹k(X)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹k(Y )))
= inffa : ½(¸(X + ¹k(X)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹k(Y )) + a) ¸ kg
= inffa : ½(¸(X + ¹k(X)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(Y + ¹k(Y )) + a) ¸ k;a ¸ 0g
¸ 0:
Concavity then follows from the translation invariance property of ¹k.
35Finally, we need to show that
½(X) = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : ¹k(X) · 0g:
We have seen in (i) above that the limit of Problem (6) is achievable. Therefore,
supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : ¹k(X) · 0g = supfk 2 (¡1;1)nf0g : 9a · 0 s:t: ½(X + a) ¸ kg
= supf½(X + a) : a · 0g
= ½(X);
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3

















Hence, ¹ ¹¡k(X) · ¹k(X) for all k > 0. Therefore, for all s < 0;t > 0,
¹ ¹s(X) · lim
k"0
¹ ¹k(X) · lim
k#0
¹k(X) · ¹t(X):
Proof of Proposition 4
Let X 2 X such that k 7! ¹k(X) is strictly increasing. We have
½(¡X) = supfk 2 (¡1;1) n f0g : ¹k(¡X) · 0g
= supfk 2 (¡1;1) n f0g : ¹¡k(X) ¸ 0g
= ¡inffk 2 (¡1;1) n f0g : ¹k(X) ¸ 0g
= ¡supfk 2 (¡1;1) n f0g : ¹k(X) · 0g
= ¡½(X)
The ¯rst and the last equalities follow from Theorem 1, the second equality is given by the symmetric
properties of the family of risk measures f¹k : k 2 R n f0gg, and the fourth equality holds since
k 7! ¹k(X) is strictly increasing.
If X is deterministic, then k 7! ¹k(X) is also constant and the argument above does not hold.
In this case, however, if X > 0, then ½(X) = 1 and ½(¡X) = ¡1. If X < 0, the opposite holds.
Thus, if X is deterministic, X 6= 0, we also have ½(¡X) = ¡½(X). In contrast, if X = 0, then
1 = ½(¡X) 6= ¡½(X) = ¡1.
36Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that X ¸(1) Y . Then E [u(X)] ¸ E [u(Y )] for all u nondecreasing and the inequality is strict
for at least one such u. Since u(x) is nondecreasing if and only if ¡u(¡x) is also nondecreasing, we
have ¡E [u(¡X)] ¸ ¡E [u(¡Y )], or, equivalently, E [u(¡X)] · E [u(¡Y )] for u nondecreasing and the
inequality is strict for at least one such u. This implies that ¡Y ¸(1) ¡X. Therefore,
¹ ¹(X) = ¡¹(¡X) · ¡¹(¡Y ) = ¹ ¹(Y ):
For SSD, we observe that a function u(x) is nondecreasing and concave if and only if ¡u(¡x) is
nondecreasing and convex. Hence, X ¸(2) Y if and only if ¡Y ¸(¡2) ¡X. The result now follows
in similar fashion to above.
Proof of Proposition 6
Note that if X ¸(1) Y , then ¹k(X) · ¹k(Y ) for all k 2 Rnf0g, since ¹k preserves FSD. By the de¯nition
of ½, it follows immediately that ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ), i.e., ½ also preserves FSD.
For the next claim, note that Y 2 X++ implies that ½(Y ) > 0. Since X ¸(2) Y and ¹½(Y ) preserves
SSD, we have
¹½(Y )(X) · ¹½(Y )(Y ) · 0:
Therefore, ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ).
Likewise, Y 2 X¡¡ implies that ½(Y ) < 0. Since X ¸(¡2) Y and ¹½(Y ) preserves RSSD, we have
¹½(Y )(X) · ¹½(Y )(Y ) · 0:
Therefore, ½(X) ¸ ½(Y ).
Proof of Proposition 7
First, it is easy to see that law-invariance of the PSM implies law-invariance of the underlying family of
risk measures (see Equation (6)). FÄ ollmer and Schied [15] show that on atomless probability spaces any
law-invariant risk measure preserves FSD, and any convex, law-invariant risk measure preserves SSD;
the claim now follows by Propositions 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 2
The boundedness properties for the family f¹k : k 2 (¡1;1) n f0gg imply ¹k(X) ¸ E [¡X] for k > 0
and ¹k(X) · E [¡X] for k < 0. It follows that when E [X] < 0, then for all k > 0
¹k(X) ¸ E [¡X] > 0:
Hence, it follows from Theorem 1 that ½(X) · 0. Likewise, if E [X] ¸ 0, then for all k < 0,
¹k(X) · E [¡X] · 0:
Again, following Theorem 1, we have ½(X) ¸ 0.
37Proof of Proposition 8
Since these are symmetric families of risk measures, it su±ces to show that ¹k(X) ¸ E [¡X] for k > 0,
which implies that for k < 0
¹k(X) = ¡¹¡k(¡X) · E [¡X]:







lnexp(E [¡kX]) = ¡E [X]:








fº + E [(¡X ¡ º)+]g
¸ inf
º2R
fº + E [¡X ¡ º]g
= E [¡X]:
Finally, for the homogenized entropic risk measure, we have
¹k(X) = inf
a>0








Proof of Proposition 9
First, it is clear that ½(XA¡¿) = 1 and ½(XB¡¿) < 1 for any ¿ 2 (0;y]. We thus focus on comparing
XC to XD over the range ¿ 2 (0;y].
There is a one-to-one mapping between target levels and satis¯cing levels. In particular, for a
particular satis¯cing level ½, let ¿(XC;½) and ¿(XD;½) be the corresponding target levels that induce













1 + q(e¡y½ ¡ 1)
¤
:
Note that ¿(XC;½) and ¿(XD;½) are both decreasing and continuous in ½. We will compare these target
functions as ½ varies and will show that there exists a unique ½? > 0 such that ¿(XC;½?) = ¿(XD;½?),
and that ¿(XD;½) > ¿(XC;½) for all ½ > ½?, and ¿(XD;½) < ¿(XC;½) for all ½ < ½?. This shows that
½(XC ¡ ¿) > ½(XD ¡ ¿) if and only if ¿ > ¿(XC;½?) = ¿(XD;½?).
First, consider ½ < 0. Over this range, we have












1 + q(e¡y½ ¡ 1)
¤
, p(e¡x½ ¡ 1) ¡ q(e¡y½ ¡ 1) > 0:
38Let g(½) = p(e¡x½ ¡ 1) ¡ q(e¡y½ ¡ 1), the left hand side of the latter inequality. Over ½ < 0, we have
g0(½) = ¡pxe¡x½ + qye¡y½
< qy(e¡y½ ¡ e¡x½)
< 0;








In sum, g(½) is a strictly decreasing function from +1 to 0 as ½ " 0 and therefore must be strictly
positive over the range, which implies that g(½) > 0 over ½ < 0, and thus ¿(XC;½) > ¿(XD;½) over this
range.
For ½ = 0, the target levels reduce to the expected values; thus, ¿(XC;0) = px > qy = ¿(XD;0).
Finally, consider ½ > 0. Similar to the ¯rst case, we have over this range
¿(XC;½) > ¿(XD;½) , p(e¡x½ ¡ 1) ¡ q(e¡y½ ¡ 1) < 0:
Let h(½) = p(e¡x½¡1)¡q(e¡y½¡1), the left hand side of the latter inequality. We have lim½#0 h(½) = 0
and lim½!1 h(½) = q ¡ p > 0. Moreover, h0(½) = ¡pxe¡x½ + qye¡y½, so










= ¹ ½ > 0:
Thus, h(½) over ½ ¸ 0 has a left limit of zero, a right limit of the positive value q¡p, and is nonincreasing
for ½ · ¹ ½ and increasing otherwise. This implies that there exists a unique ½? ¸ ¹ ½ > 0 when h(½) crosses
zero. Note furthermore that h(½?) = 0 is equivalent to ¿(XC;½?) = ¿(XD;½?), i.e., ¹½?(XC) = ¹½?(XD).
Also, since ½? > 0, we must have ¿(XC;½?) = ¿(XD;½?) < E [XD] = qy as claimed.
In summary, we have shown that there is a single target level ¿? with the desired construction such
that the satis¯cing levels of XC and XD coincide at ¿?; below ¿?, XD is preferred to XC and vice versa
for above ¿?. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10
First, notice that for any ¿ < y, ½(XA ¡ ¿) = 1 and ½(XB ¡ ¿) < 1, so ½(XA ¡ ¿) > ½(XB ¡ ¿).
Now consider XC and XD. For XD, any target ¿ < y induces a corresponding value ^ ½(¿) = ½(XD ¡¿),





(1 ¡ q)e¡^ ½(¿)y + q
i
= ¡¿ , ¿ = ¡¹^ ½(¿)(XD)
must hold. Notice that ^ ½(¿) is monotonically decreasing on ¿ 2 (0;y). In order to have ½(XC ¡ ¿) >
½(XD ¡¿), we must have ¹^ ½(¿)(XC ¡¿) < 0. Considering separately the two cases whether ^ ½(¿) > 0 or





pe¡^ ½(¿)x + (1 ¡ p)
i
< ¡y , ¹^ ½(¿)(XB ¡ y) < 0:
39Therefore, we can choose ¿ small enough such that ^ ½(¿) · ½(XB¡y) holds, which leads to the threshold
value ¿? in the result. Notice that x > y > 0 and p > 0 imply that ½? = ½(XB ¡ y) > 0; this in
conjunction with q < 1 implies that ¿? = ¡¹½?(XD) < y.
For y > ¿ > ¿?, we have ^ ½(¿) < ½?, so ½(XC ¡¿) > ½(XD ¡¿) and ½(XA ¡¿) > ½(XB ¡¿) over the
range (¿?;y), as required.
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose there exists a Q¤ 2 Q such that EQ¤ [X] < 0. From Theorem 2, we have, for k > 0,
¹k(X) = sup
Q2Q
¹Q;k(X) ¸ ¹Q¤;k(X) ¸ EQ¤ [X] > 0:
Hence, ½(X) · 0. Likewise, suppose there exists a Q¤ 2 Q such that EQ¤ [X] ¸ 0; we have, for k < 0,
¹k(X) = inf
Q2Q
¹Q;k(X) · ¹Q¤;k(X) · EQ¤ [X] · 0;
and again invoking the representation theorem for PSMs, it must be that ½(X) ¸ 0.
Proof of Proposition 11




s.t. ¹ · Ef [X] · ¹;
Ef [1] = 1
f(x) ¸ 0; 8x 2 [x;x]:
We can consider f to be an in¯nite dimensional vector indexed by x 2 [x;x]. By weak duality, the









r + ¹s ¡ ¹t : r ¸ max
x2[x;x]










maxfexp(¡ax) ¡ xs + xt;exp(¡ax) ¡ xs + xtg + ¹s ¡ ¹t : s;t ¸ 0
ª
:
By inspection, when a ¸ 0, strong duality is achieved by a two point distribution with P(X = x) = p
and P(X = x) = q and dual variables s = 0, t = (exp(¡ax) ¡ exp(¡ax))=(x ¡ x) ¸ 0: Likewise, when
a < 0, strong duality is achieved by a two point distribution with P(X = x) = p and P(X = x) = q and
dual variables s = (exp(¡ax) ¡ exp(¡ax))=(x ¡ x) ¸ 0, t = 0:
40Tables
¿ Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 83:7 £ 10¡6 1:90 £ 10¡6 0
250,000 1 18:4 £ 10¡6 0 ¡8:36 £ 10¡6
500,000 1 4:80 £ 10¡6 ¡0:60 £ 10¡6 ¡1
695,000 ¡1 0 ¡0:92 £ 10¡6 ¡1
2,000,000 ¡1 ¡4:60 £ 10¡6 ¡4:60 £ 10¡6 ¡1
Table 1: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C, and D described in the main text, by entropic prospective
satis¯cing measures (see Example 1), assuming di®erent values for the target ¿. In bold are the preferred
gambles in each pair for each target.
¿ Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 3.76490 0:04798 0.00000
250,000 1 1.66770 0:00000 -0.46876
500,000 1 0.08759 ¡0:04440 ¡1
695,000 -1 0:00000 ¡0:12513 ¡1
2,000,000 -1 ¡1:19251 ¡1:36274 ¡1
Table 2: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C, and D described in the main text, by homogenized
entropic prospective satis¯cing measures (see Example 3), assuming di®erent values for the target ¿. In
bold are the preferred gambles in each pair for each target.
¿ Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 4.48864 0:08311 0.00000
250,000 1 3.91202 0:00000 -1.51413
500,000 1 0.10259 ¡0:69315 ¡1
695,000 -1 0:00000 ¡1:02245 ¡1
2,000,000 -1 ¡2:01490 ¡2:07944 ¡1
Table 3: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C, and D described in the main text, by CVaR prospective
satis¯cing measures (see Example 2), assuming di®erent values for the target ¿. In bold are the preferred
gambles in each pair for each target.
41Entropy Homo. Entropy CVaR
¿ Gamble A Gamble B Gamble A Gamble B Gamble A Gamble B
10 0:10986 0.04055 0:92936 0.28243 1:06471 0.37156
30 0:03662 0.01320 0:70421 0.14970 0:99325 0.30010
50 0:02192 0.00688 0:53253 0.07043 0:91629 0.22314
70 0:01542 0.00347 0:39361 0.02393 0:83291 0.13976
90 0:01153 0.00104 0:27980 0.00254 0:74194 0.04879
110 0:00876 0.00000 0:18730 0.00000 0:64185 0.00000
130 0:00655 0.00000 0:11402 0.00000 0:53063 0.00000
150 0:00462 0.00000 0:05889 0.00000 0:40547 0.00000
170 0:00281 0.00000 0:02160 0.00000 0:26236 0.00000
190 0:00097 0.00000 0:00246 0.00000 0:09531 0.00000
210 -0.00104 0:00000 -0.00254 0:00000 -0.04879 0:00000
230 -0.00347 0:00000 -0.02393 0:00000 -0.13976 0:00000
250 -0.00688 0:00000 -0.07043 0:00000 -0.22314 0:00000
270 -0.01320 0:00000 -0.14970 0:00000 -0.30010 0:00000
290 -0.04055 0:00000 -0.28243 0:00000 -0.37156 0:00000
¿ Gamble C Gamble D Gamble C Gamble D Gamble C Gamble D
10 0.00000 0:04055 0.00000 0:28243 0.00000 0:37156
30 0.00000 0:01320 0.00000 0:14970 0.00000 0:30010
50 0.00000 0:00688 0.00000 0:07043 0.00000 0:22314
70 0.00000 0:00347 0.00000 0:02393 0.00000 0:13976
90 0.00000 0:00104 0.00000 0:00254 0.00000 0:04879
110 0:00000 -0.00097 0:00000 -0.00246 0:00000 -0.09531
130 0:00000 -0.00281 0:00000 -0.02160 0:00000 -0.26236
150 0:00000 -0.00462 0:00000 -0.05889 0:00000 -0.40547
170 0:00000 -0.00655 0:00000 -0.11402 0:00000 -0.53063
190 0:00000 -0.00876 0:00000 -0.18730 0:00000 -0.64185
210 ¡0:00104 -0.01153 ¡0:00254 -0.27980 ¡0:04879 -0.74194
230 ¡0:00347 -0.01542 ¡0:02393 -0.39361 ¡0:13976 -0.83291
250 ¡0:00688 -0.02192 ¡0:07043 -0.53253 ¡0:22314 -0.91629
270 ¡0:01320 -0.03662 ¡0:14970 -0.70421 ¡0:30010 -0.99325
290 ¡0:04055 -0.10986 ¡0:28243 -0.92936 ¡0:37156 -1.06471
Table 4: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C and D given in the main text by entropic (columns 1-2),
homogenous entropic (columns 3-4) and CVaR PSM (columns 5-6), as function of the target ¿. In bold
are the preferred gambles in each pair for each target.
42Asset vi vi ºi ºi
1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2 -30.0 6.0 4.0 5.0
3 -40.0 8.0 5.0 6.0
4 -50.0 10.0 8.0 9.0
5 -60.0 15.0 11.0 12.0
6 -100.0 20.0 15.0 16.0
Table 5: Supports [vi;vi] of the distributions of assets' percentage returns Vi and the corresponding
ranges [ºi;ºi] for the expected returns for the portfolio choice example in Section 5.
Asset
¿ 1 2 3 4 5 6 ½
2.0 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
3.0 0.718 0.065 0.049 0.077 0.054 0.036 0.3220
4.0 0.435 0.130 0.099 0.155 0.109 0.073 0.1610
5.0 0.153 0.195 0.148 0.232 0.163 0.109 0.1073
6.0 0.000 0.192 0.164 0.292 0.210 0.142 0.0795
7.0 0.000 0.069 0.138 0.348 0.261 0.183 0.0585
9.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.350 0.361 0.289 0.0315
11.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.488 0.512 0.0146
14.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.0031
18.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.0136
Table 6: Optimal asset allocation under the entropic PSM for various values of the target ¿ for the
portfolio choice example in Section 5.
43